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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have emerged as one of the hottest fields today
due to their low-cost, self-organizing behavior, sensing ability in harsh environments, and
their large application scope. One of the most challenging topics in WSNs is security. In
some applications it is critical to provide confidentiality and authentication in order to
prevent information from being compromised. However, providing key management for
confidentiality and authentication is difficult due to the ad hoc nature, intermittent
connectivity, and resource limitations of the network. Though traditional public key-
based security protocols do exist, they need large memory bandwidths and complex
algorithms, and are thus unsuitable forWSNs.
Current solutions to the security issue in WSNs were created with only
authentication and confidentiality in mind. This is far from optimal, because routing and
security are closely correlated. Routing and security are alike because similar steps are
taken in order to achieve these functions within a given network. Therefore, security and
routing can be combined together in a cross-layer design, reducing the consumption of
resources.
The focus of this work is on the integration of routing and key management to
provide an energy efficient security and routing solution. Towards this goal, this work
proposes a security protocol that encompasses the following features: integration of
security and routing, dynamic security, robust re-keying, low-complexity, and dual levels
of encryption. This work combines all the robust features of current security
implementations while adding additional features like dual layer encryption, resulting in
an extremely efficient security protocol.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Within the last decade, wireless technology has substantially increased its
presence in the marketplace. This phenomenal growth stimulated advancements in the
wireless sector, eventually leading to the creation ofWireless Sensor Networks (WSNs).
The primary purpose of a WSN is to gather data from a remote location in a secure
fashion. WSNs are one of the hottest fields due to their low cost, high flexibility, and self
organizing behavior. However, due to the nature of wireless communication, data is
available in the air for any third party to acquire. This feature along with the ad hoc
nature, intermittent connectivity, and resource limitations ofWSNs result in a number of
design challenges.
In particular, the availability of data to third parties causes numerous security
issues. Therefore, it is critical to provide confidentiality and authentication in order to
prevent information from being compromised. Traditionally, security is provided through
public-key based protocols. However, these protocols require large memory bandwidth
and complex algorithms [45]. The limited resources ofWSNs make this type of security
unsuitable for implementation. In response, security protocols that provide security while
taking into account the unique features and resource limitations ofWSNs are preferred.
Currently, there exists very little work in the security ofWSNs. Some pioneering
work has been done on key management/pre-disfribution/generation in WSNs, mainly ad
hoc networks [31, 45, 51]. But there is a common shortcoming for those schemes: they
focus purely on security and ignore the particular features ofWSNs [30]. These schemes
implement security at the expense of energy and routing efficiency [30]. This is far from
optimal, because routing and security are closely correlated. Routing and security are
alike because similar steps are taken in order to achieve these functions within a given
network. Therefore, security and routing can be combined together in a cross-layered
design, reducing the complexity of the protocol.
The focus of this work is on the integration of routing and key management to
provide an energy efficient security and routing solution. This work combines all the
robust aspects of current security protocols while adding additional features. The features
comprised in this work are as follows: integration of security and routing, dynamic
security, robust re-keying, low-complexity, and dual levels of encryption.
The integration of routing and security result in a cross-layered design. This is
highly beneficial because it reduces redundancy and overhead by integrating similar
aspects of these layers. Maintaining the idea of layers allows for a level of abstraction
resulting in easy modifications and insertions into other applications. Along with an
independent and integrated layer, it is important to make security dynamic to support
topology changes in a WSN.
Dynamic topology is native to a WSN because nodes can fail or be added. This
feature ofWSNs makes it vital to have a dynamic security protocol. A dynamic security
protocol adapts to network changes and can distinguish between legitimate node addition
and enemy infiltration. One of the key features in supporting dynamic security is the
ability to re-key.
Re-keying is a feature that is extremely valuable to WSN security [45]. The
dynamic nature ofWSN topology makes it vital to refresh (re-key) certain keys. This is
done in order to authenticate valid nodes and to ensure that enemies do not acquire keys
easily. Without re-keying, enemies can acquire network keys through failed nodes. It is
important to provide features like these without adding to protocol complexity [42].
Low-complex security is essential to WSNs because of the limited resources
available in individual nodes. Therefore, traditional public key based security is
unsuitable for WSNs [30]. This work uses a symmetric key based scheme in order to
reduce memory requirements and computational overhead related to decrypting,
encrypting, and key generation. There is always a tradeoff between changing from public
key based encryption to symmetric key based encryption. Features like shorter key
lengths and less complex key generation result in a less resource hungry solution but an
overall reduced level of security.
A dual level of encryption is introduced in this work in order to increase the level
of security. This is achieved through the use of two symmetric keys simultaneously. The
level of security is increased because two separate keys need to be acquired instead of a
single key. This feature combined with symmetric key encryption, results in a robust
security protocol that is ideal forWSNs.
In order to design a security protocol for WSNs, an in depth understanding of the
following is needed: the features of a WSN, how they operate, and current security
protocols. An in depth discussion of these topics is provided in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 steps
through the background of a WSN, the challenges of designing a WSN security protocol,
and the shortcomings of existing work.
Following Chapter 2, Chapters 3 through 8 discuss various aspects of the proposed
protocol. Chapter 3 focuses on the messages and components of the protocol architecture.
It explains every type of message that is used within the system and describes all
components and their function. In Chapter 4 the steps and procedures taken by the system
at initial startup are presented. It provides a detailed description of what goes on during
initial system setup. Chapter 5 focuses on how the system functions after initial system
setup and the aspect of security once setup has completed. Chapter 6 is dedicated to the
security of the system, both during initial system setup and post initial setup. In Chapter 7
the protocol's ability to support secure post deployment expansion is discussed. Chapter
8 explains the simulation tool that was used to simulate the protcol and all acquired
results. An in depth performance analysis of the acquired results is provided in Chapter 9.
The thesis ends with conclusions and possible future improvements in Chapter 10.
Chapter 2. Background
In recent years, there has been a vast increase in the use ofwireless devices as well
as the emergence of a variety of different wireless technologies such as Bluetooth [39],
Wireless LAN [40], Third-generation cellular networks [41], and so on. In fact, it was
predicted that wireless data access will exceed wireline by the year 2004, as was seen at
the end of 2004 [32] (see Figure 1).
Forecast of Users With Wireline VersusWireless High-Speed
(Individual) Access, North America, 1998-2003
Wireless
?Wireline
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: Datacomm Research Co.
Figure 1: Wireless Data access [32]
A WSN is comprised ofwireless sensor modules, called nodes. Each node is made
up of a few key components: a micro-sensor to detect the desired event; a low-cost
application-specific microprocessor; memory to store information; a battery for power;
and a transceiver for communication between the node and the rest of the network.
Micro-sensor nodes consist of cost effective and extremely power efficient parts with
only the required functionality.
Owing to the small size of the sensor on each node, the sensing range of a single
node is extremely limited (typically 10 to 50 meters [30]). The small size of the sensor,
and the lack of large and complicated signal conditioning circuitry, leads to high data
error rates (> 10"3) [45]. However, due to their low cost nature, hundreds and thousands
of nodes can be used to sense events in buildings, battlefields, or other places. In a WSN,
a single event can be detected by multiple nodes. This data redundancy can be used to
achieve fault tolerance (that is, nodes can fail without effect to the network).
Typically, a WSN will self-organize itself into a "cluster" architecture [46] after
sensor deployment. A "cluster" includes a group of neighboring nodes where one of the
group nodes is selected as a Clusterhead (CH). The
"clustering"
algorithms use
parameters such as sensor energy level, mobility, location, etc. to form clusters and
determine CHs. This work implements a security protocol based on a clustered topology.
This work assumes one of the current energy efficient clustering algorithms (such as load
balancing clustering [46]) is used to form clusters. Data is aggregated by the CH who
removes duplicated or redundant data. This can also be done within the network by
having nodes closer to the CH aggregate the data coming from nodes farther away
through eavesdropping (see section 5.3).
In terms of wireless sensor design, a paradigm shift occurred from traditional
macro-sensors to the micro-sensors used in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Sensors
are becoming smaller and cost effective. Traditionally, automated sensors, called macro-
sensors, are large (size > 20mm) and consist of complex functionality [43]. Macro-
sensors generally have a large battery or a reliable power source, resulting in a long
lifetime (at least years [43]). Macro-sensor networks normally consist of a small number
of sensors (typically tens of), due to the high cost of each sensor (typically > $100 each
sensor) [43]. Advances in technology have lead to a miniaturization of circuits (smaller
transistors and more layers), power efficient transceivers and microprocessors, and more
effective RF transmission. These advances enabled sensors to become extremely small,
more power efficient, and more cost effective; for instance, a UC Berkeley "smart dust"
can work for a year on two AA batteries, and is about the size of a penny. These are
called micro-sensors [44]. Micro-sensors are cheap and expendable (typically < $10
[45]), allowing them to be deployed in a single large-scale network.
WSNs based on micro-sensors make possible the reliable monitoring of various
environments for different applications. Many new features are provided to sensing
applications byWSNs. These include:
Fault Tolerance: WSNs are more fault tolerant than traditional macro-sensor
networks because sensors are close enough together that data is correlated [30].
Improved Accuracy: An individual micro-sensor generates less accurate data
then an individual macro-sensor. However, because nodes are close together and
their data is redundant, once aggregated, the data enhances the accuracy of the
sensed signal and reduces the uncorrected noise [45].
Low Cost: Even though a large number of micro-sensors nodes are used, these
nodes are smaller, less reliable, less complex, less accurate individually, and
therefore cheaper [30].
Large range of sensing: Even though individual sensor nodes have limited
wireless communication ranges (< 15 meters [30]), sensors can relay information
In this work, only micro-sensor based WSNs are mentioned.
in a multi-hop path. Therefore, sensor data can be transmitted longer distances
(e.g. a few miles).
The first successful micro-sensor products were termed 'Smart Dust,* or 'Motes',
which are now provided by Crossbow Company [33]. There are over 30 integrated sensor
network providers such as Crossbow [33], Millennial Net [35], Ember Corporation [36],
Sensicast Systems [37], MicroStrain [38], to name a few. These products have been
integrated into various applications such as: environmental, defense, aerospace, etc.
This work focuses on proving that an integrated approach to routing and security
reduces energy consumption. Existing work in WSN Security looks at security through
the application layer, disregarding the internal architecture of a WSN. Only end to end
security is of concern (as seen in Figure 2), not internal security. If an integrated
approach is adopted, security can be insured at every step of the internal network
including the ends.
END ENDB
i Traditional approach to Security J
END A ENDB
[ Integrated Security with respect to )
WSN Architecture !
Figure 2: Integrated security approach versus traditional approach
This work shows the energy benefits of this approach through simulations. An
analytical mathematical model is beyond the scope of this work. In addition, the lack of
current work in this particular approach makes it difficult to provide a comparative
analysis. Therefore, this work focuses on showing the energy improvements of this
approach with respect to traditional approaches.
2.1 Challenges ofDesigning Sensor Network Security
Many of the rising applications, such as military and medical applications require
security to insure data confidentiality, owing to the sensitive nature of the data. Unlike a
wired network, wireless networks broadcast all their messages over a radio link, and
these messages can therefore be picked up by unauthorized devices. The focus of this
work is on the integration of routing and key management to provide an energy efficient
security and routing solution. A lightweight security protocol based on a hierarchical
WSN routing protocol is designed.
An important challenge in the implementation of security in WSNs is that two
important resources memory and energy are extremely limited due to the size of the
sensor, which can be as small as a penny [30]. Conventional security schemes such as
Kerberos [47], Needham-Schroeder [48], Otway-Rees [49], Bellare-Rogaway [50]
require extremely large amounts of memory (< 100's of MBs) [6] and are
computationally intensive. Thus, sensor network security schemes should not consume
copious amounts of energy (< 10's of Joules) [30] during key management and should
not use large amounts ofmemory (< 100's ofMBs) [30] to store security information. It
is also vital to design security schemes such that they are adaptive to network topology
changes due to node failure, node addition, and interruptions in the wireless transmission
medium [30]. For example, if nodes fail due to low power, messages will fail to be
delivered because routes containing the dead nodes still exist. In the case of node
addition, it is important to distinguish between legitimate sensor traffic, and the
infiltration of the network by an enemy node. Also, intermittent connectivity must be
considered because the security scheme should be able to deal with wireless errors. These
considerations along with the resource constraints imposed make the design of a security
scheme a challenging task.
This work recognizes these issues and focuses on designing a security protocol,
called SPECTRA (Secure Power Efficient Clustered Topology Algorithm), which is
energy efficient (less than 10's of mJs) [42] and exploits the synergy between adjacent
layers of the protocol stack. A cross-layered approach to the design of a security protocol
can reduce computation, communication, and memory requirements [42]. However, in
conventional WSN security schemes such as LEAP [25] and uTESLA [9], Routing and
Security are performed separately, leading to superfluous communication between
sensors. In contrast, the results of this work show that a cross-layer design would
eliminate this redundant communication by performing both functions in a single
exchange ofmessages.
2.2 Current work on sensor network security
Currently, the existing work in the security ofWSNs is very limited. Some of the
key attributes of prominent research work in WSN security is as follows: broadcast
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authentication, key predistribution, and intrusion detection. These features are discussed
in greater detail below.
Broadcast authentication: The pioneering work on securing sensor networks is
SPINS [6,7], which proposes uTESLA, an important innovation for achieving broadcast
authentication of any messages sent from the base-station (BS). An improved multi-level
uTESLA key-chain mechanism was proposed in [8,9].
Key predistribution: to make sure that any pair of sensors can find a shared key
to encrypt/decrypt their messages. Note that the use of a public key (asymmetric) scheme
is not plausible, since the limited memory of a sensor may not be large enough to hold a
typical public key of a few thousand bytes [6]. A trusted-server scheme is not advised,
since in WSNs, one generally cannot assume any trusted infrastructure [11]. Instead, it is
better suited to bootstrap secure communications among sensors using key predistribution
to preload some symmetric keys within the sensors. A key-pool scheme was suggested in
[12] to guarantee that any two nodes share at least one pairwise key with a certain
probability. Multiple pairwise keys may be found between nodes through the schemes in
[13]. Key predistribution schemes utilizing location information were described in [14-
16].
Intrusion detection: In WSNs, a challenging problem is to detect compromised
sensors and then to tolerate intrusions by bypassing the malicious sensors [17]. A basic
requirement is to limit the impact of compromised sensors into a limited local area
instead of allowing an intrusion to affect the majority of the network [18,19]. The BS
may be responsible for most of the intrusion detection since the sensors are too limited in
memory and energy [20].
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SPECTRA combines a few key features from existing protocols. SPINS [7] and
Pebblenets [4] inspired the utilization of global authentication and a clustered topology in
the SPECTRA protocol. In the following discussion, these two security protocols are
explained.
2.2.1 SPINS
A prominent security protocol in WSNs is SPINS [7], which was designed and
developed at UC Berkeley. SPINS was implemented using two already existing security
protocols. It uses SNEP[7] and uTESLA[7] as its two building blocks. SNEP was used to
provide data confidentiality, two-party data authentication, integrity, and freshness [7].
uTESLA was used to provide authentication for broadcast purposes (Figure 3 shows a
diagram of the time released function of uTESLA to achieve authentication).
Kq K-) K.2 K3 K4
P1 P2 P6 P7
Figure 3: uTESLA time released key chain for source authentication [9]
SNEP provides a number of advantages like semantic security, data
authentication, replay protection, weak freshness, and a low communication overhead.
These features make SNEP an extremely robust protocol and a useful security block for
implementation. uTESLA is not a security protocol like SNEP but an authentication
protocol. uTESLA is a derivative of the TESLA [7] protocol and is specifically designed
for sensor networks. The original TESLA protocol used symmetric key encryption, which
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is computationally too intensive for sensor networks [9]. uTESLA implements a one-way
time released key chain that is used for source authentication. This key is refreshed
periodically, resulting in global authentication [9]. This idea of global authentication is
also implemented in SPECTRA but without the use of a key chain.
SPINS is a powerful protocol because of its periodic global authentication and
flexible scalability, yet the weakness of SPINS exists in network topology and global
authentication. SPINS does not implement clusters and instead has each node share a
pair-wise key with the BS. This is inefficient due to the communication overhead of
having each node communicate directly with the BS. This results in a lowered system
lifetime, the loss of data aggregation, and the occurrence of data duplication. Global
authentication using uTESLA suffers from the same problem of node-to-BS
communication.
Like SPINS, SPECTRA implements global authentication but without node-to-BS
communication. SPECTRA supports clustering which results in data aggregation, the
reduction of data duplication, and a longer system lifetime. Aspects of SPECTRA are
extended upon some of the robust features of SPINS. However, this work modifies these
features to support system lifetime, data aggregation, and a cross-layered design (which is
explored in Chapter 5).
2.2.2 Pebblenets
Pebblenets [4] is a security protocol that utilizes clusters and multiple keys. It
implements global authentication through a periodically refreshed traffic encryption key
(TEK). Every node within the system is authenticated through this global TEK.
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Pebblenets also implements a network backbone that is comprised of all head cluster
nodes. A unique key is used for intra-backbone communication while a different unique
key is used for intra-cluster communication. The Pebblenets protocol is comprised of two
main phases. In the first phase, the network nodes organize into clusters and create a
backbone. The second phase consists of a small number of the backbone nodes
generating new keys, which are then broadcast to all nodes [4]. The following diagrams
depict a Pebblenet showing its group of clusters and its cluster backbone.
Figure 4: Pebblenet partitioned into clusters [4]
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Figure 5: Pebblenet cluster backbone [4]
There are many similarities between Pebblenets and SPECTRA, such as the
utilization of clustering, a network backbone, global authentication, and multiple keys.
However, unlike SPECTRA, Pebblenets does not implement a routing protocol along
with its security protocol [4]. A downfall to Pebblenets is the idea of having all keys
being generated by a backbone node. Key generation is based upon a nodes personal key
that is provided at deployment. Therefore, if a priority node is captured, new keys can be
generated and distributed, resulting in full system compromise. Due to Pebblenets lacking
a routing protocol, network and security setup becomes complicated (requires established
routing before adding security) and energy inefficient. SPECTRA solves these problems
by implementing a routing protocol and having a secure source generate the system key
(to be discussed in section 3.7.4).
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2.3 Summary
This chapter discussed WSNs, how they work, their features, and the challenges
of designing security protocols in WSNs. The design considerations and associated
challenges pertaining to WSN security were discussed methodically in order to
understand the motivations behind the novel approach to security proposed in this work.
This chapter also provided information on existing work in the field of WSN security,
including the robust features and shortcomings of current work. Now that the motivations
and challenges behind WSN security are better understood, the architecture of the
proposed protocol in this work can be more easily comprehended. The following chapter
steps through the architecture of the proposed protocol and the components within it.
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Chapter 3. Proposed Protocol Architecture and Components
In response to the limitations (see Chapter 2) of contemporary security protocols for
WSNs, this work proposes a new WSN protocol named SPECTRA that emphasizes
security without sacrificing power-efficiency. SPECTRA was designed to take into
account the unique requirements of a WSN, such as low-power, low-memory, limited
computation, and the error-prone wireless radio medium.
There are many variables that can be considered in the area of wireless sensor
networks. However, many of these variables are only in question in certain layers of the
protocol stack. With this in mind, certain assumptions are made when dealing with
certain layers in order to analyze only the variables that pertain to the layer in question. It
is important to understand the assumptions that are made for the area of security. The
following assumptions are generally accepted in security considerations for WSNs.
Base-Station: the base station is assumed to be trusted and cannot be
compromised. It also has unlimited transmission power and a redundant power
source. The base station is responsible for re-keying and refreshing the network,
as well as collecting data from the entire network.
Wireless errors: wireless errors are dealt within the physical layer of the protocol
stack and outside the scope of this work.
Wireless bottlenecks: bottlenecks and traffic congestion are dealt with in the
physical layer of the protocol stack and outside the scope of this work.
Frequency of Communication: this characteristic is dealt within the application
layer and outside the scope of this work. The application layer is responsible for
generating and periodically sending data.
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Predistribution scheme: the initial routing structure, or predistribution structures
are assumed to be in place. Therefore, initial authentication is conducted by
utilizing the already existing topology. Therefore, nodes do not have to directly
communicate with the base-station. Though this work supports predistribution, it
deals strictly with post distribution security.
Data aggregation: implemented through a data aggregation policy that is
integrated into this work. Data aggregation itself is outside the scope of this work
and simple integrated.
In order to understand how the SPECTRA protocol works in its entirety, a thorough
understanding of each component utilized in the architecture is needed. This chapter will
discuss the main functions of different components in SPECTRA and the innovations
behind this protocol. Components include physical objects in the network along with
specific entities that are used to provide network functions (such as keys, messages, and
route formation). A system diagram that provides an overview of the SPECTRA protocol
can be seen in Figure 6. The diagram provides an overall picture of the SPECTRA
protocol and the components that comprise it: clusters, nodes, CHs, a BS, and messages.
This chapter will provide an in depth coverage of all messages used within the SPECTRA
network along with the types ofkeys and how they are used. Routing, on the other hand,
will only be covered briefly because routing takes place during initial system setup (see
Chapter 4).
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Figure 6: SPECTRA Overview Diagram
3.1 Innovations ofProposed Protocol
SPECTRA is innovative because it combines the robust features of existing
protocols while adding additional features. The features comprised in this work are as
follows: integration of security and routing, dynamic security, robust re-keying, low-
complexity, and dual levels of encryption. These features are discussed in greater detail
below.
(I) Seamless integration of security with scalable routing protocols: A cross-
layered design approach is highly beneficial because it reduces redundancy and overhead
by integrating related layers [42]. SPECTRA is highly practical because it was designed
to integrate routing and security without sacrificing power. It is a dynamic protocol where
security is provided independent of central control. Existing work overlooks the idea that
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any security scheme should be seamlessly integrated with the special characteristics of
WSN architecture, especially routing protocols; otherwise, the security scheme may not
be practical or energy-efficient from the network protocol point of view [30].
Thorough research of the field has found that most of the existing WSN security
strategies focus only on key management / security algorithms. For example, all existing
key-predistribution schemes try to establish pairwise keys between each pair of nodes.
However, most sensors do not need to establish a direct point-to-point secure channel
with sensors multiple hops away since WSNs use hop-to-hop communication techniques
to achieve long distance transmission. One of the most famous schemes, SPINS [7],
simply assumes a flooding-based, spanning-free architecture with the BS as the tree-root.
However, the establishment and maintenance of a global spanning tree in a large-scale
WSN with a large footprint may not only bring unacceptable communication overhead
(and thus increased energy consumption2), but also cause a large transmission delay and
make the impractical assumption of time synchronization in uTESLA (a broadcast
authentication protocol [9]). An important feature of this work is that it has a robust hop-
to-hop transmission scheme and can recover from multiple key losses. Routing and
security can be combined because similar steps are taken in order to achieve these
functions within a given network.
(2) Dynamic Security: Dynamic network topology is native to WSNs because
nodes can fail or be added. This feature requires a security protocol to be adaptive to
changes in network topology. Topology changes occur due to node fall out or node
addition. In the case where nodes fall out, these nodes must be removed from the network
2 Most of the sensor's power is consumed by communication, not instruction processing [30]. The energy
used to communicate one bit of data can be used to execute over 1000 local instructions [6]. High energy
consumption can drain sensors quickly and thus shorten the network lifetime.
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completely. If this is not done, these nodes can be impersonated by an enemy because the
nodes still exist within the network. If security is not updated, keys can be acquired from
nodes that have failed. In the case ofnode addition, a protocol must be able to distinguish
between legitimate node addition and attempted enemy infiltration. Given these reasons,
adaptive security should be present for WSN applications in order to ensure overall
network security. If adaptive security protocols aren't designed and employed, network
compromise becomes far easier.
(3) Robust re-keying: As mentioned above, a dominant feature of WSNs is the
dynamic network topology. Sensors may run out of battery power and new sensors may
be added to the network. More importantly, network enemies might compromise sensors
and all security information in those sensors may be obtained. Therefore, after key-
predistribution and sensor deployment, a re-keying scheme should be used to update
some types of keys such as group keys and session keys. This is done to ensure that
enemies cannot acquire the keys easily. In this work, a re-keying protocol that can adapt
to dynamic network conditions such as sensor compromise and topology change was
implemented.
(4) Low-complex implementation. This work uses a symmetric-key-based scheme
because memory use is amajor concern in WSNs [30]. This prohibits the use ofmemory-
intensive asymmetric keying schemes. Asymmetric keying schemes need more complex
cryptography calculations and protocols, which can bring too much communication
overhead compared to symmetric-key-based schemes. This protocol also has low
transmission energy due to its cluster-based key management. Key generation and
distribution protocols with several hash computations and global key delivery rounds can
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quickly drain the limited power of a node. Due to WSNs consisting of hundreds, if not
thousands, of nodes, network topology/densities can change; therefore, a centralized or
flooding-based security scheme cannot scale well. Thus distributed algorithms and
localized coordination to achieve global convergence and scalability is preferred [30].
(5) Dual levels of Encryption: In switching from traditional public key based
protocols to symmetric key based protocols, overall security is reduced. It is harder to
compromise public keys because they are generated from more complex algorithms and
are far larger. Symmetric keys, on the other hand, are shorter and are generated through
far simpler functions, making compromise all the simpler. SPECTRA attempts to
increase the level of security by using two symmetric keys simultaneously. This requires
an enemy to compromise two separate keys instead of a single key.
In summary, SPECTRA combines the following features into a protocol catered for
WSN security:
Cross layered design approach to security and routing
Dynamic security
Robust re-keying
Low complexity
Dual levels of encryption
Global Authentication to support global eavesdropping
Separate Routing and Datagram encryption
Maintenance of clusters without adding CHs
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, SPECTRA combines features from other
protocols. Global Authentication is a feature that is loosely inspired by the SPINS
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protocol [7], but its implementation in SPECTRA is significantly different. SPINS
proposes global authentication to take place through direct communication between the
nodes and the base station (BS). SPECTRA provides global authentication through a
broadcast approach, reducing the overhead corresponding to direct transmission to the
BS. Transmission overhead is also decreased through the cluster based topology
employed by the SPECTRA protocol.
SPECTRA achieves power-efficiency by reducing inter-node communication
overhead through data aggregation and efficient routing via a wireless backbone
consisting of CHs (explored in Chapter 5). Figure 6 shows a brief overview of the
protocol architecture and its physical components: nodes, CHs, and clusters. The nodes
organize themselves into clusters around a CH. A CH is similar to a normal sensor node
in all respects, except that it has a larger battery leading to a longer life. Network
topology or clustering is conducted to optimize CH distribution (see 3.5).
CHs provide security and routing services to all the nodes in the network. Other
cluster topology protocols (such as LEACH [51], Pebblenets [4], LiSP [31]) do not define
the notion of a CH with a larger battery. This deficiency places disproportionate power
demands on their CHs (regular sensor nodes), resulting in earlier node failure and
reduced system lifetime [4]. The power requirements for a CH are larger because it
handles all intra-cluster and inter-cluster communication. CHs aggregate all the data from
the sensor nodes in their cluster and transmit it to the BS all at once, reducing the total
number of messages sent. Before messages are transmitted, keys are used within the
network to encrypt them.
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SPECTRA uses three types of symmetric keys: a Personal key, a Cluster key, and a
System key. Initial system setup utilizes the initial key and the personal key to encrypt its
messages, insuring confidentiality and authentication during the normally-vulnerable
initial system setup phase. This approach also insures confidentiality of the network
topology, and authentication along with every message sent within the system (discussed
in Chapter 6). Therefore, unlike other proposed protocols such as SPINS [7], LEACH
[51], and Pebblenets [4] (see section 2.2), authentication does not need to be performed
separately, and is integrated into routing.
3.2 Role ofBase-station in SPECTRA
In a WSN, a BS collects results from all sensors [30]. Current WSN security
research assumes the BS to be invulnerable to compromise, and is always trusted [30].
The BS is also assumed to have effectively unlimited battery power (such as a redundant
AC power source), wireless transmission range, memory space, and computational
capacity. It shares a pair-wise key with every node and CH in the network. The BS issues
cluster keys to authenticated CHs during the cluster organization phase. It is also
responsible for periodically broadcasting the latest system key to the network. The
functions of the BS can be summarized as follows:
Initial authentication ofnodes and CHs during initial system setup
Global authentication of a system once it has been set up
Data querying (requesting data from the network)
Collect information regarding network topology from CHs
Authentication ofnew nodes added after initial setup
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The BS's primary function during the initial system setup phase is to authenticate
every node and CH in the system. This is accomplished by an exchange of messages
between the nodes and the BS. Once all nodes and CHs are authenticated in the initial
system setup phase, the cluster-organization phase begins. The BS's role in this phase is
to respond to requests (by authenticated CHs) for cluster-keys.
Once system setup and cluster-organization phases are completed, the BSs role is
simplified to generating data queries in response to user requests, and periodically
refreshing the system key. The system key is broadcast every epoch (system key expiration
period), encrypted with the old system key. Nodes could fail to get the latest system key
due to wireless transmission errors. SPECTRA overcomes this challenge by broadcasting
the new system key three times in rapid succession at the start of every epoch. This also
provides periodic authentication of every node and CH in the network (discussed in 4.1
and 6.2).
The BS also keeps track of network topology. This includes knowledge of all
CHs, their clusters and cluster keys, and the member nodes in each cluster. This
knowledge is used in the event ofCH compromise (see section 6.6). In this situation, the
BS is able to intelligently reorganize the cluster's member nodes into a new cluster.
3.3 Role of Sensor Nodes in SPECTRA
Nodes are simple, small, and cheap [30]. Their limited functionality includes
sensing and generating data, which they then transmit to their CH. Within a cluster, nodes
organize themselves into multi-hop routes to the CH [46].
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Nodes are periodically authenticated by receiving and decrypting the latest system
key. They use this key to encrypt their routing headers so that other nodes will not
disregard their messages. In theory, all nodes along the route know the latest system key,
enabling them to determine the next hop from the routing header. This is achieved by
decrypting the packet using the latest system key in order to obtain the routing header.
The routing header is then used to determine the next hop.
After authentication, all nodes belonging to the same cluster get a shared cluster
key from their CH which is used to encrypt the data portions of their messages. This
cluster key allows for eavesdropping to prevent data duplication (see section 5.3).
3.4 Role ofClusterheads in SPECTRA
CHs are nodes with additional responsibilities. During system setup, CHs organize
nearby nodes into a cluster. In the situation where nodes are equally placed from multiple
CHs, nodes join the CH that responded first. They are also responsible for acquiring and
issuing the cluster-key to the nodes in their cluster. Each CH obtains a cluster key from
the BS after the initial system setup phase. The CH transmits the cluster key to nearby
nodes in response to their requests to join the cluster, encrypted with the system key.
CHs'
main function within the cluster is to aggregate data received from cluster
member nodes. Data is collected and duplicate data is discarded, resulting in the
aggregation of all member node data. Aggregated data can be forwarded to the BS in
response to a data query. All CHs together form a wireless routing backbone.
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3.5 Role ofClusters
Clusters are formed by using an existing energy efficient clustering algorithm.
SPECTRA incorporates the load balancing clustering algorithm, which can form clusters
with balanced traffic distribution among clusters [46]. Clusters are beneficial in WSNs
because they reduce the distance of communication required for nodes within the network
[4, 30], i.e. every node does not have to directly communicate with the BS, increasing
system lifetime.
Cluster formation begins with an authenticated CH requesting a cluster key from
the BS. The CH receives the new cluster key and decrypts it with the system key. After
the CH has the cluster key, it broadcasts an advertisement to all nearby nodes. Nodes
listen to these advertisements, and after waiting for some period of time (half an epoch
see 6.2.2.1), join the cluster from which they receive the highest RSS (Received Signal
Strength). The request of joining the cluster is encrypted with the system key. The CH
responds by sending the cluster key back to the node, encrypted with the system key. The
CH is responsible for keeping track of all member nodes in its cluster. After the cluster
organization phase is completed, the CH forwards a list of all nodes in the cluster
(through a message) to the BS, encrypted with the system key.
The data portions of all messages sent within the cluster are encrypted with the
cluster key. Like all messages in the SPECTRA network, the routing headers ofmessages
sent within the cluster are all encrypted with the system key. This dual-key system insures
both authentication, and confidentiality. The usage of two different keys (cluster and
system keys) within a cluster provides double authentication: The system key
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authenticates a node as a member of the network, whereas the cluster key authenticates a
node as a member of the cluster.
3.6 Routing
Clusters have an internal topology where messages are forwarded within the
cluster through multi-hop routes to the CH. These routes are organized in a multi-hop
route to the CHs. During the cluster-organization phase, all nodes send out Node
Advertisements. These advertisements make all nodes aware of their neighbors, and allow
for the construction of Intra-Cluster and Inter-Cluster routing tables.
3.6.1 Inter-Cluster Routing
Data messages generated by nodes must be collected and aggregated at the CH.
Periodically or in response to a data request message, this aggregated data is forwarded to
the BS. If the BS is not a neighbor of the sending CH, multi-hop routes are required to the
BS. These multi-hop routes only contain CHs and do not use nodes to forward data.
Inter-cluster routing organizes multi-hop paths to the BS and only consist ofCH-
to-CH communication, resulting in the CH backbone of the SPECTRA network. This
backbone is used for all normal system operations. These paths are determined through
the use of Route Request Messages (RREQ) and Route Reply Messages (RREP) (further
details of the use ofRREQs and RREPs will be discussed in section 3.8.3.3). The transfer
of routing messages allows CHs to form their routing tables, which are used for intra-
cluster and CH to BS communication.
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3.6.2 Intra-Cluster Routing
Intra-cluster routing is used to organize multi-hop paths to the CH inside the
cluster. Nodes send CHs their collected data periodically or in response to data request
messages. If the node is not a neighbor of the CH, the node must determine a multi-hop
route to the CH. Determining a multi-hop route entails broadcasting an RREQ. The
RREQ propagates to the destination, which generates an RREP message. The RREP is
returned to the sending node that adds the new route (contained in the RREP) to its
routing table (further details of the use ofRREQs and RREPs can be seen section 3.8.3.3).
3.6.3 Intra-Cluster and Inter-Cluster Routing Tables
Routing information is contained in the routing tables. Typically, each node or
CH only has knowledge of a small number of routes due to memory limitations. Routing
tables are filled in through the exchange of system routing messages, a detailed
description ofwhich can be found in section 3.8.3.3.
Each route in the routing table contains the number ofhops from a source node to
a destination node and the addresses of all the intervening nodes in a route. Every
message in the SPECTRA system must have a routing header. Except in the case of
broadcast messages, the routing header always contains a route copied from the routing
table of the source node.
3.7 Keys
SPECTRA achieves security within the network through the use ofpair-wise keys
for encryption. This section provides an overview of all keys used within SPECTRA: the
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personal key, the cluster key, the initial key, and the system key. These keys are used to
encrypt every message passed within the SPECTRA network. All keys within the
SPECTRA network are computed through one-way radix hash functions (see 6.1) and a
pseudo-random number generator. The pseudo random number generator is used to
generate a number that is the desired key length. A one-way radix hash function is then
applied to this number in order to generate the key. In the case of refreshing a current
key, the current key is used in place of the generated number and the hash function is
applied to the current key to generate the new key. Thepersonal keys are generated prior
to deployment and are stored within the node memory. The following table shows the
definitions for all notations used in the key expressions:
Notation Definition
/
one-way
->
One-way radix hash function used to
generate the keys
PRNG
Pseudo Random Number Generator
used to generate the number that is
the desired key length
X The key size
KP Personal Key
-^Cluster
Cluster Key
current Kclusler
Current cluster key that is used to
generate the refreshed key
refreshed Cluster
Refreshed cluster key
System
System key
current KSyslem
Current system key used to generate
the refreshed key
refreshed System Refreshed system key
Table 1: Symbol Definitions for Key Expressions
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The following expressions depict the key generation for each type ofkey:
f{PRNG{x))=Kp
one-way
>
Equation 1: Expression for generating Personal keys
f(PRNG(x)) = Kclusler
one-way
Equation 2: Expression for generating Cluster keys
J \rKNU\K current K J) A refreshed cluster
one-way
>
Equation 3: Expression for generating refreshed Cluster keys
f (PRNG(x)) = KSyslem
one-way
Equation 4: Expression for generating System keys
J yrKl\U\K current K JJ= A refreshed System
one-way y
->
Equation 5: Expression for generating refreshed Cluster keys
3.7.1 Personal key
Personal keys are used for initial authentication in the SPECTRA network. They
are pair-wise keys that are only used once for authentication and are considered invalid
thereafter. This is done in order to ensure that a failed node cannot be reinserted into the
network by an enemy.
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3.7.1.1 Clusterhead Personal key
CHs use their personal key during initial system setup when first authenticating
with the BS. On system startup, the CHs all send a request to the BS, encrypted with their
personal and initial keys. Because the initial key is used, the routing information for the
authentication message can be eavesdropped, allowing neighbors to forward the request
on. The request is for a cluster key, and to register them as a CH. The BS responds by
sending both the latest system key and a new cluster-key encrypted with the personal-key
of the requesting CH.
When a new CH is added to the system after the end of the initial deployment
phase, a similar process is used to authenticate the new CH. Before the new CH is
deployed, its personal key and unique node ID are registered with the BS. The new CH
sends a request for a new cluster-key encrypted with its personal key, and the BS replies
by sending the system key and cluster-key, encrypted with thepersonal key and initial key
(3.7.3). This also serves to authenticate the new CHs.
3.7.1 .2 Node Personal key
Each node has a pair-wise personal key shared between that node and the BS.
These personal keys are programmed into each node before system deployment, and are
used to authenticate new sensor nodes joining an existing SPECTRA network. The
personal key is used to encrypt a message broadcast when the node attempts to join the
system. This message is received by the BS, which shares the pair-wisepersonal key that
was used to encrypt the message. The BS then sends out the latest system key to the
joining node, encrypted again with thepersonal key.
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Once the new node has the latest system-key, it has been authenticated to the
network, and can attempt to join a cluster. Encrypted with this new system key, the node
then broadcasts a request for advertisements from nearby clusters. All the nearby CHs
respond with an advertisement, encrypted with the system key. This advertisement
contains the cluster ID number. The node requests to join the closest cluster, based on the
received signal strengths of these advertisements. The CH responds by sending its cluster
key to the joining node, encrypted with the system-key. Finally, the CH adds the new
node to its node table (a table of all registered cluster members), and notifies the BS of
this addition.
3.7.2 Cluster key
A cluster key is negotiated between the CH and the BS, and is then distributed to
every member of the cluster. In order to get a cluster-key, the CH must authenticate itself
with the BS using its personal key. Within a cluster, all messages are encrypted with the
cluster key. The notion of a cluster key allows nodes to eavesdrop on packets in multi-hop
routes to the CH. If a node receives and decrypts a data packet that duplicates its own, it
will forward the original packet, but it will not send its data.
The cluster key is the primary means of insuring data confidentiality. All sensor
data from the nodes is encrypted with the cluster key before being forwarded to the CH.
A second layer ofprotection is achieved by encrypting the routing header and the already
encrypted message content with the system key. Both keys are needed in order to
understand the contents of the message. The contents of the routing header (encrypted
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with the system key) must be known in order to choose which key to decrypt the body of
the message with (most commonly the cluster key).
SPECTRA supports both periodic refreshing of the cluster key at the CH as well
as refreshing in response to compromise. The desired functionality is dependent on the
level of security threat in the surrounding network. If periodic refreshing is chosen, the
CH generates a new cluster key and broadcasts it to its cluster, encrypted with the latest
system key. In the case of a compromise, negotiating with the BS generates an entirely
new cluster key. All nodes are authenticated with the BS before receiving the new cluster
key.
3.7.3 InitialKey
During initial system setup, every node and CH must authenticate themselves with
the BS using the initial key, theirpersonal key, and their node ID number. The purpose of
the initial key is to encrypt the routing information of the initial authentication message.
This ensures that all information within the network is encrypted and confidential.
Authentication comes from the BS in the form of the latest system key which is used to
replace the initial key.
3.7.4 System key
During system setup, every node and every CH must authenticate itselfwith the
BS using the initial key, its personal key, and its node ID number. Authentication comes
from the BS in the form of the latest system key. All of the routing headers of all packets
in the system are encrypted with the system key (except for the initial authentication
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request see 3.7.3), and so it is impossible to send or receive a packet without the latest
system key. System keys expire periodically in time intervals denoted as epochs. At the
start of every epoch, the BS broadcasts a new system key three times in rapid succession,
encrypted with the previous system key. All nodes in the system receive this broadcast,
and use the old system key to decrypt the new system key. The following sections discuss
the role of the system key in CHs and nodes.
3.7.4.1 Nodes
Nodes only use the system key for authentication and encrypting routing headers.
Whereas they use the cluster key for encrypting the data portions off their messages.
Together, the system key and the cluster key achieve confidentiality.
3.7.4.2 Clusterheads
CHs use the system-key for multi-hop routing to the BS. Unlike nodes, CHs use
the system key for encrypting both the routing header and the data portion of a message.
They also use the system key for authentication.
3.8 SPECTRA Message Types
SPECTRA uses three types ofmessages: setup messages, data messages, and system
messages for different functions. Setup messages are used for tasks that pertain to setting up the
system, such as: node and CH addition, authentication, key refreshing. Data messages are used for
sending and receiving data as well as generating data queries. System messages are generally used
for tasks that affect the system or its topology, for example: node removal. A breakdown of all the
messages within SPECTRA can be seen in Figure 7. Different messages are encrypted with different
keys. Since different types of keys are utilized, security is enhanced because both the key type and the
corresponding message type must be known.
Table 2 below shows the definition of all notations used in the message descriptions.
Notation Definition
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jy-
"**" Cluster
Cluster Key
System System key
Rt Header Routing header for a packet. Holds
the route from source to destination.
Data
Data or information that is being
relayed in the message
AggData
Aggregated data from a cluster
(group of
nodes'
data) being sent in
a message to the BS.
Table 2: Symbol Definitions for Messages
The diagrams below show example ofmessages that are generated at the node and at the
CH.
KSystem [Rt Header \ Kcluster {Data)\
Equation 6: Message involved in node-to-node and CH-to-node communication
Ksyslem [^ Header \ KSystem {AggData)\
Equation 7: Message involved in CH-to-CH and CH-to-BS communication
In the case of system messages, the data portions of the messages seen above are
replaced with the corresponding message. The diagram below shows a tree structure of
all messages that are used in SPECTRA as well as which part of the system they pertain
to. A detailed description of each message can be found later in this section (3.8.2, 3.8.3,
and 3.8.4).
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3.8.1 Message Headers
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Every message sent passes through the routing and security layer, where it gets a
routing header that includes:
Message Source
Message Destination
Number ofHops
List ofHop IDs
Whenever any node receives a packet, the first thing it does is use the latest
system key to decrypt the routing header, and figure out if the message is intended for that
node, or needs to be forwarded to the next hop on the path to its destination.
This routing header is constructed from the routing table of the node sending the
message. If that node does not have the latest system key, then any packets that it sends
will be rejected and ignored. In order to actually send a real data or command message,
the actual route to be taken to the destination must be known. If this route is not known,
then a routing request message will be sent, and the initial message will be kept in a
waiting list until a route to its destination is known. Whenever an RREP packet is
received or eavesdropped, the list ofwaiting messages is scanned to verify if any of them
have become deliverable as a result ofnewly discovered routes.
3.8.2 Setup Messages
These are messages used during the system setupphase and for system expansion,
when nodes or CHs are added after initial deployment. They are used for the formation of
clusters, and for initial and post-deployment authentication. The following sections go
over each type of system message in detail.
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3.8.2.1 Message '''Node authentication request"
Nodes request authentication from the BS. This request contains the node ID. The
data portion of the message is encrypted with the node's personal key while the routing
information is encrypted with the initial key. This message registers the node with the BS.
In response, the BS replies with an authentication message. Each personal key can only
be used to request a system key once.
3.8.2.2 Message UCH authentication request"
CHs authenticate the same way as nodes, but also identify and register themselves
as CHs with the BS. The data portion of this request is encrypted with the personal key of
the requesting CH, which authenticates the requester with the BS. The routing portion of
this request is encrypted with the initial key. In response to this request the BS replies
with an authentication message. Each personal key can only be used to request a system
key once.
3.8.2.3 Message "Authentication"
This message is sent back by the BS in response to a request for authentication.
The data portion of this message is encrypted with the personal key of the authenticating
node or CH. The routing information is encrypted with the initial key. If the
authenticating party is a node, then the message contains only the latest system key. If the
authenticating party is a CH, then this message also contains a cluster key.
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3.8.2.4 Message "Clusteradvertisement"
CHs broadcast this message, encrypted with the system key, to all nodes during
initial system setup. A cluster advertisement message contains the CH's ID and the
cluster key. This message type is also utilized during the post-deployment addition of a
CH. Nodes use the RSS (received signal strength) of these advertisements in order to
determine which cluster they should join.
CHs listen to each other's advertisements, and use this to construct their neighbor
tables of nearby CHs. This dual usage of messages reduces the communication needed
for system setup. A single set of broadcast advertisements allows for the organization of
nodes, the distribution of cluster keys, and the construction of neighboring CH neighbor
tables.
3.8.2.5 Message "Clusterjoining"
In response to CH advertisements. Nodes broadcast a request to join the cluster
from which they received the highest signal strength. This message is encrypted with the
system key, and in response, the CH adds the joining node to its cluster member registry.
CHs also register the requesting node as a member of their cluster in response to this
message. This registry of nodes in the cluster is eventually forwarded to the BS after the
completion of the cluster organization phase of system setup.
The header of a cluster joining message is encrypted with the system key, and so
these messages are also used by nearby nodes to construct their neighboring node tables
to facilitate the creation ofmulti-hop routes to the CH.
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3.8.2.6 Message "Refresh system key"
Periodically, the BS sends out new system keys. Each of these periods is defined
as an epoch. The new system key is always encrypted with the previous system key. This
means that any node must have the previous system key in order to get the latest system
key. This message is broadcast to the entire network and each individual node
authenticates itself by decrypting the new system key. This type ofmessage is also never
forwarded.
3.8.2.7 Message "Refresh cluster key"
This message is sent by a CH in response to the discovery of a missing or
compromised node (see section 6.5). This message can also be sent in a periodic fashion
if the network environment requires additional security. The message is encrypted with
the system key and contains a new cluster key.
3.8.3 Data Messages
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of a WSN is to gather data. Nodes generate data
from their sensors, encrypt it with their cluster key, and forward it to the CH. The CH is
responsible for data collection, as well as forwarding the aggregated data to the BS. The
actual contents of a data message are the data value and the node ID from which the data
originated.
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3.8.3.1 Message "Node-to-CH"
This is the most common and frequent type ofmessage that will pass through the
system. All nodes periodically generate these messages, and forward them to their CH,
encrypted with the cluster key. Data messages in multi-hop routes to the CH are
eavesdropped by nodes along the way. If this data is found to duplicate the forwarding
nodes' data, then the message is forwarded. When this occurs, the timer on the
forwarding nodes data generation is reset, so duplicate data will not be sent.
3.8.3.2 Message "CH-to-B^
CHs collect and aggregate data from the nodes in their cluster, and periodically
send all of this data to the BS. This packet contains multiple data messages and the
cluster ID. If this message was in response to a data query, then it also contains the query
ID number. This data aggregation is encrypted with the system key and can be forwarded
to the BS along a multi-hop route ofCHs.
3.8.3.3 Routing Messages
In order to get a valid route to a given destination, such as the BS, a route must be
established. Routes are established on a reactive basis when needed, usually during the
initial system setupphase.
3.8.3.3.1 Message "RREQ"
When a node needs to communicate with a node for which it does not have an
entry in its routing table, that node sends a Route Request message (RREQ) to all of its
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neighbors. The neighbors then forward the RREQ to their neighbors, each appending their
node ID. This process continues until the RREQ is received by the destination, which
replies to the first RREQ message received.
3.8.3.3.2 Message "RREP"
Route Reply messages (RREP) are generated in response to an RREQ, by the
destination node, or a node that knows a route to the destination. An RREP contains the
complete route from source to destination. This message then follows the path that it
specifies back to the requesting node (the source).
Unlike RREQs, RREP messages are eavesdropped by all nodes that receive them
and the route in the RREP is extracted in order to fill in the intervening nodes routing
table. This eavesdropping takes place to reduce unnecessary routing communication.
3.8.4 System Messages
System messages are those messages that pertain to the system operation of the
SPECTRA network. System messages handle aspects of the system such as power
management, cluster re-organization after CH death or compromise, and acknowledging
received messages.
Cluster re-organization occurs in response to CH death or compromise. A CH
notifies the BS once its power has dropped below a certain threshold (this is a low-power
notification message - 3.8.4.2). After the CH dies, the BS broadcasts a cluster-
reorganization message to the corresponding cluster, encrypted with the old cluster key.
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Like CHs, nodes send low-power notification messages. Instead of sending this
message to the BS, they send it to their CH. When the node finally dies, the CHs
broadcasts a Removalmessage to its cluster, encrypted with the cluster key.
The Removal message instructs all receiving parties to remove the specified node
from their routing tables. The Removal message also advises effected nodes to
proactively establish new routes, replacing those routes that contained the dead node. In
the case that a Removal message was unable to be sent, the SPECTRA network removes
nodes and CHs automatically if they are not heard from (assumed as compromised, see
section 6.6).
An ACK is sent in response to every valid successfully-decrypted non-broadcast
message. NAKs are not used in SPECTRA in order to avoid replying to flooding by the
enemy. If NAKs were used, flooding of incorrectly encrypted or erroneous messages
would result in excessive communication leading to reduced system lifetime.
3.8.4.1 Message "Re-organize Cluster"
When a CH dies or is compromised, the BS broadcasts a re-organize cluster
message (containing a new cluster key) to the corresponding cluster, encrypted with the
latest system key. This message informs the recipients of the CHs death and advises them
to re-organize. The cluster re-organizes itself by appointing the node with the largest
remaining power as the new CH. Then newly appointed CH will then proceed to integrate
itselfwithin the existing backbone through RREPs and RREQs.
3.8.4.2 Message "Low-Power"
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The message is generated by both nodes and CHs once their remaining power
drops below a certain threshold. The only difference between a node generated and CH
generated power message is the recipient. In the case of a node, the message is sent to the
CH, encrypted with the cluster key. While in the case of the CH themessage is sent to the
BS, encrypted with the system key. This message informs the recipient of the nodes
power level and causes the recipient to set a timer that is three times the predicted
remaining lifetime of the node. The timer is set to three times the predicted lifetime
because survey work has shown that most nodes die within this timer [45]. In the case
that a node or CH die before this message is generated, the removalmessage is in place to
handle this situation (3.8.4.3).
3.8.4.3 Message "Removal"
This message is generated by the detecting node or (nodes detect compromises
from a failure to respond to a message) when the timer created in response to the low-
power message expires. If the message is generated at the BS, it is encrypted with the
system key and broadcast to all CHs (the SPECTRA network backbone). If the message
was generated at a CH or node, it is encrypted with the cluster key and broadcast to its
cluster. This message is responsible for informing all receiving parties to remove the dead
node (specified in message) from their routing tables. The removal message also advises
all recipients to proactively establish new routes, replacing those routes that contained the
dead node.
3.8.4.4 Message "ACK"
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Every non-broadcast successfully decrypted message must be Acknowledged
(ACKed) at every step along the way to its destination. This ensures reliable
communication and reduces re-sending within the network. If an ACK is not received
within some period of time, the message must be re-sent. An ACK is not sent if the
received message is encrypted incorrectly or if it is encrypted with an out-of-date system
key.
3.9 Summary
This chapter provided an in depth coverage of the SPECTRA architecture and the
components within it. The specific functionality associated with clusters, CHs, and nodes
was discussed. This chapter also went through in detail the three types of messages:
setup, system, and data messages that exist within the SPECTRA protocol. It also
provided a brief overview of routing and how routes are established within the network.
The information portrayed in this chapter provides a better understanding of the protocol
architecture and its specific components. As a result, system setup and functions can be
more easily understood. The following chapter will go through the initial setup of routing
and security within a SPECTRA network.
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Chapter 4. Initial System Setup
SPECTRA system setup consists of three phases: the authentication phase, cluster
organization phase, and route establishment. Together these three phases comprise the
initial system setup phase. Each of these system setup phases builds upon the previous
phase and must be completed before the following phase can commence. A detailed
description of each phase is described in the following sections.
4.1 Authentication Phase
In order for any node or CH to participate in the SPECTRA network, it must be
authenticated. A diagram depicting an overview of the authentication phase can be seen
in Figure 8. A node is authenticated by having the latest system key. In order to get the
latest system key, a node broadcasts a request to the BS, encrypted with that node's
personal key (Figure 9) and the initial key. The BS knows that the node is authentic
because the node has the personal key associated with its node ID. The BS replies to the
node by broadcasting back the latest system key, encrypted with the initial key and the
personal key of the requesting node (Figure 10). The node receives and decrypts the
system key, and can then attempt to join a cluster.
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Figure 8: Overview ofAuthentication Phase
When initially requesting the latest system key, CHs authenticate themselves in
the same fashion as nodes, through their personal key and the initial key. They also
identify themselves as CHs, and request a cluster key which they will use to organize a
cluster. CHs receive both the latest system key and a cluster key in reply to their
authentication request.
It is important to note that only the data portion of the authentication request is
encrypted with the node's personal key while the routing information is encrypted with
the initial key (see sections 3.8.2.1-3.8.2.3). After this initial authentication, and for the
rest of its lifetime, a node will continuously receive and decrypt the latest system key.
This ensures continuous authentication.
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4.2 Cluster Organization Phase
The cluster organization phase of SPECTRA sets up the network topology
through the creation of clusters. A diagram depicting an overview of the cluster
organization phase can be seen in Figure 1 1 . Clusters are formed by using an existing
energy efficient clustering algorithm. SPECTRA incorporates the load balancing
clustering algorithm, which can form clusters with balanced traffic distribution among
clusters [46].
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Once a CH is authenticated, it broadcasts an advertisement, encrypted with the
latest system key (Figure 12). Advertisements contain the cluster ID number, and the
cluster key. Nodes listen to these advertisements and record their RSSs. The strongest
recorded RSS is associated with the nearest CH, and the node sends a cluster join
message to this CH, encrypted with the cluster key. The cluster key is received through
the cluster advertisement. In the case that a node receives a few advertisements after
some delay and is already integrated into a cluster, a node can simply change its cluster
based on the new advertisements. This is achieved through the same process as post-
deployment addition (see Chapter 7).
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As cluster joining requests are received, the CH adds those nodes to its cluster
member registry (Figure 13). The CH keeps a counter that is reset whenever a node joins
its cluster. When the counter expires, the CH sends a cluster organization report to the
BS, encrypted with the system key. The cluster organization report is complete with the
cluster ID, the CH ID, the current cluster key, and the cluster member registry (Figure
14). The clustermember registry is a list of all nodes within a given cluster.
The BS keeps track of network topology through the cluster member registry of
each CH. Whenever there is a change in the topology of a cluster, a new cluster
organization report is sent to the BS. This knowledge is used in the event of CH
compromise in order to re-organize the cluster.
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Figure 12: CH broadcast an advertisement to all nodes in the network
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4.3 Route Establishment
This phase of the protocol is responsible for setting up the communication routes for inter-
cluster and intra-cluster routing. A diagram depicting an overview of the route establishmentphase
can be seen in
Figure 15. After clusters are organized, but before the CH sends its first cluster
organization report, CHs find a route to the BS. If the BS is not one of its neighbors then
the CH broadcasts a Route Request (RREQ, see section 3.8.3.3.1 and Figure 16) message.
A neighbor is defined to be a node who's RSS is above a certain threshold, and every hop
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of every multi-hop route must occur between neighbors. This is a dynamic feature that is
implemented by the MAC layer, which is not in the scope of this work.
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Figure 15: Overview ofRoute Establishment Phase
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All routing messages are broadcast and CHs keep track of the sequence number of
each message. When a CH receives a RREQ message, it checks to see if the requested
destination is one of its neighbors. If the receiving node is the destination of the RREQ,
then it generates a Route Reply (RREP) message containing the whole route from source
to destination (Figure 17). Only the first received RREQ is replied to. All following
RREQmessages with the same sequence number are ignored.
RREP{A.B,C,D}-
Eavesdrop
RREP
RREP{A,BC,DJ
RREP{A,B.C,D}-
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Figure 17: RREP generated at Destination and sent back to Source, eavesdrop by surrounding nodes
If the current recipient is not a neighbor of the requested destination, then it
forwards the RREQ to all of its neighbors through a broadcast encrypted with the system
key. It appends its own node ID to the route contained within the RREQ before
forwarding the message. In the event that the RREQ is intended for one of the neighbors
of the current recipient, themodified RREQ is forwarded only to the destination.
This route organization process is used for both CH to BS routing, and for node to
CH routing within a cluster. Like RREQ messages, RREP messages are encrypted with
the system key, allowing both nodes and CHs to eavesdrop on routing information (Figure
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17). This allows them to fill in their own routing tables without sending additional RREQ
messages.
4.4 Summary
This chapter stepped through the three phases of system setup: the authentication
phase, cluster organization phase, and route establishment. The authentication phase is
responsible for authenticating all nodes and CHs. The cluster organization phase is
responsible for organizing clusters within a SPECTRA network. Finally, the route
establishment phase is responsible for creating communication links between the nodes,
CHs, and BS of a network. Knowledge of these phases provides an understanding ofhow
the system is initially setup. With initial system setup understood, the next chapter steps
through the operations of a SPECTRA network after it has been setup.
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Chapter 5. System Operation after Initial system setup
As discussed in Chapter 4, the initial system setup consists of authenticating
network members, forming them into clusters, and establishing communication links
between them. The system operation phase of the SPECTRA network commences after
the system setup phase has been completed. The normal activities of a SPECTRA
network are primarily concerned with data movement and continuous authentication.
These activities include: data collection, data aggregation, data transmission, continuous
authentication, and eavesdropping. This chapter goes through the functions of the
network after initial system setup.
5.1 Data Collection, Aggregation, and Transmission
All data is generated at the sensor node, in response to an event or time period.
When a node has new data it forwards that data to the CH periodically or in response to a
data request message. The data follows a direct or multi-hop route to the CH, where it is
stored and aggregated (see Figure 1 8).
The CH maintains a collection of the most recent data generated by each of the
member nodes in its cluster. This data is aggregated in order to avoid duplication and is
later forwarded to the BS periodically or in response to a data query. Data duplication is
avoided by truncating sample values that are similar and come from the same region of
the sensor network. The specific data aggregation policy, which includes data duplication
strategies, is implemented at the application layer of the CH. SPECTRA does not contain
any native data aggregation policy, but supports any reasonable data aggregation policy.
Third party data aggregation algorithms, such as the CAG algorithm [52] can be easily
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integrated with the SPECTRA protocol. This can be done because data aggregation is not
natively a part of the security or routing layer of the protocol stack. Therefore, because
data aggregation can be implemented in a different layer, it can easily be integrated with
SPECTRA [45].
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Figure 18: Diagram depicting single-hop and multi-hop data aggregation
When aggregated data is sent to the BS, it is encrypted only with the system key.
This allows other CHs along the CH backbone of the SPECTRA network to eavesdrop on
the current transmission in order to support further data aggregation.
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5.2 Continuous Authentication
All nodes and CHs in a SPECTRA network are continuously and periodically
authenticated. This authentication is achieved through the periodic refreshing of the
system key. A system key is only valid for a period of time that is referred to as an epoch.
At the start of every epoch the latest system key is broadcast three times in rapid
succession by the BS, encrypted with the previous system key (Equation 8 shows the
expression for a refreshed system key). The system key is broadcast three times in order to
reduce the effects of wireless errors and the resulting chances of a node failing to
authenticate.
Any message whose routing header is not encrypted with the latest system key is
disregarded and not ACKed. Therefore, a node will be totally ignored by the rest of the
SPECTRA network if the node does not have the latest system key.
It is assumed that node compromise will take longer than an epoch. This
guarantees that a node tampered with by the enemy does not have the latest system key
when it attempts to rejoin the network. The node cannot attempt to rejoin the SPECTRA
network, because eachpersonal key can only be used once to acquire the latest system key
(this is generally done during system setup).
J \fRNLr\K current K JJ A refreshed System
one-way y
>
Equation 8: Expression for refreshed system key (see Table 1 for symbol definition)
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5.3 Eavesdropping to reduce redundancy
Eavesdropping occurs in several parts of a SPECTRA network, reducing
unnecessary communication. Eavesdropping occurs on data messages on their way to the
CH, on data messages on their way to the BS, and on all RREP routing messages.
Data messages within a cluster are eavesdropped by any nodes that they pass
through on their way to the CH. All data messages within a cluster are encrypted with the
cluster key. Nodes decrypt and examine the contents of all data messages that pass
through them. This allows nodes to avoid sending data messages regarding or duplicating
events that other nodes in the cluster have already reported.
Data aggregation messages sent by a CH to the BS along the CH backbone are
also eavesdropped by all intervening CHs. This allows for further data aggregation and
reduces data duplication and communication.
Like all routing messages, RREP routing messages are encrypted with the system
key, allowing them to be eavesdropped. This allows every node that hears them to decrypt
the RREPmessage, and append the corresponding route contained to their routing tables.
5.4 Summary
To summarize, a SPECTRA network is primarily responsible for collecting and
transmitting data in a secure fashion once initial system setup has been completed.
Eavesdropping is conducted within clusters in order to reduce the amount of data being
transmitted. This data is transmitted securely by encrypting the data messages with keys.
The data being received by the BS can be trusted because the entire network is
authenticated periodically through the system key.
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This chapter along with Chapters 3 and 4 provided a complete understanding of
how the SPECTRA network is setup and works along with the functions of every
component. This knowledge allows for the security features of SPECTRA to be better
understood and how they fit into different aspects of the network. Chapter 6 is devoted to
security and how it is achieved through keys and authentication.
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Chapter 6. System Security
Security is the focus of the SPECTRA network, and the algorithms raison d'etre.
Security is achieved entirely through the use of symmetric key cryptography. SPECTRA
is innovative in its use of multiple keys for encrypting each message. This makes node
compromise and key compromise intricate for the enemy. Not onlymust the right keys be
known, but it must also be known in which order to apply them to a given message.
The focus of this chapter is the security aspect of SPECTRA. This chapter goes
through encryption, confidentiality, dual keys, and authentication. Global authentication
is an extremely important aspect to the SPECTRA protocol because it confirms the
validity of network members periodically. This feature was loosely inspired by the
SPINS protocol as discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter also focuses on the system
response to compromised nodes and CHs. This chapter starts out by discussing the
foundation of any security protocol: keys and encryption.
6.1 Keys and Encryption
The SPECTRA network utilizes multiple keys to achieve security, authentication,
and confidentiality. Due to the limitations of sensor nodes, all keys within SPECTRA are
symmetric. Symmetric keys provide security, but are simpler, smaller, and
computationally less intensive then asymmetric keys.
SPECTRA uses three main keys: the system key, the cluster key, and a personal
key. The system key is used for global authentication purposes and is periodically
refreshed. Thepersonal key is used for initial node authentication during the system setup
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phase. The cluster key is used for security within a cluster, and is used to encrypt the data
portions of all messages exchanged within the cluster.
Encryption in SPECTRA is achieved natively through one-way radix hash
functions. One-way hash functions are utilized because of their computational ease, low
memory and resource overhead, resulting in an infeasible reverse engineering algorithm
to determine the original data that was applied to the function. They provide good
encryption with little strain on resources; therefore, one-way hash functions are extremely
attractive for use in WSN security [30]. SPECTRA is not limited to a single encryption
algorithm and was designed to support various methods. The choice of encryption is
dependent on the application and the network environment (inhospitable environments
call for superior encryption algorithms). However, SPECTRA was designed with one
way hash functions in order to prolong system lifetime. It is important to understand how
hashing works in order to fully comprehend encryption in SPECTRA.
Hashing is a transformation that represents a string of characters or numbers with
a shorter fixed length value. The hashing algorithm is called a hash function, the resulting
hash value derived by the hash function can be thought of as a "mixed up" version of the
original value [5]. The digital signature or key is transformed by the hash function,
resulting in a hash value. This new value is now used as the encryption key. The resulting
hash value is used with the hash function to index the original value or key in database
applications. However, in the case of encryption, the resulting hash value is the derived
key that will be used for encryption. Therefore, hashing is always a one-way operation
[5]. Good hash functions produce unique hash values for each input. Therefore, the same
hash value will not be generated by two different inputs (characteristic of hash functions
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[5]). Hash functions also hold the property of multiple hashes for a single value. This is
done by breaking up the original value that is applied to the hash function into blocks.
These blocks are then transformed individually using the hash function and concatenated.
The concatenation is then hashed again. Each block is the same size, and if remainders
occur they are included in a padded block or discarded. This results in a far more secure
transformation, making reverse engineering even more difficult. The diagram below
shows the concept ofblocked hashing.
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Figure 19: Multi-blocked hashing [5]
SPECTRA implements a one-way radix transformation hash function. This
particular hash function takes in a digital value that allows it to change base (or radix).
Therefore, a decimal or octal key can be transformed into a hexadecimal key (hash
value). This creates an exceptionally infeasible reverse engineering algorithm because the
original base and the final base are different [5].
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6.2 Authentication
During the initial system setup phase, SPECTRA achieves authentication through
each node using its personal key and initial key. Once the initial system setup phase has
completed, SPECTRA authenticates the entire system by periodically refreshing the
system key.
All nodes and CHs are frequently and periodically authenticated. This global
authentication is achieved by periodically refreshing the system key. A node's or CH's
personal key and initial key must be used in order to get the system key for the first time.
After this key is acquired, the system key is used to get all of the later system keys, thus
achieving periodic authentication.
The concept of authenticating the entire network periodically is based on the
SPINS protocol [7]. The SPINS protocol shows the benefits in security through periodic
authentication [7]. This feature allows every entity in the network to be confirmed and
reduces the chances of compromise because compromise has to occur before the system
is authenticated again.
6.2.1 Global Authentication
Global authentication is achieved periodically through the use of the system key
(the initial key is used during initial authentication). The system key is broadcast three
times in rapid succession to the SPECTRA network at the beginning of every epoch. The
latest system key is encrypted with the previous system key. The system key is periodically
refreshed and encrypts every routing header. Therefore, a node has to have knowledge of
it in order to function within the SPECTRA network. The periodic refreshing
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authenticates each node to the BS as well as authenticating it to anyone communicating
with it. If a node can decrypt the routing header, it is authenticated. Since the system key
is dispersed to the whole network and refreshed every epoch, global authentication is
achieved periodically. A diagram depicting the broadcast of the latest system key at the
beginning of an epoch can be seen in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: Diagram depicting one of three broadcasts done during Global Authentication
An epoch is defined to be a period of time that is less than the predicted time
required for node compromise. The epoch time is dependent on the network environment
and is determined by an environment analysis. An epoch is used for scheduling the
broadcast of the latest system key. At the state of every epoch, the system key is broadcast
three times in rapid succession. This is done to combat wireless interference, fading, and
packet error rates [41]. The assumption that an epoch is less than the time period of
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compromise is the foundation of SPECTRA'S global authentication. Figure 21 shows
how authentication is achieved using an epoch.
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Figure 21: Epochs for Global Authentication
6.3 Dual Key Usage
Dual keys are extremely important in the SPECTRA network because they make
compromise exceptionally difficult and provide two levels of authentication. Not only
must a compromised node have knowledge of three different keys, but also know exactly
when to use them. Also, because of different keys and message sizes, it is extremely
difficult to decipher the different portions of the message.
SPECTRA uses two keys to provide confidentiality and authentication at every
step in the network. All routing information of any message passed within the SPECTRA
network is encrypted with the system key (or the initial key during the initial system setup
phase see section 4.1) while the data portion is encrypted by either the system key, the
cluster key, or the personal key of the node. Therefore, in order to even function within
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the SPECTRA network, knowledge of the current system key must be known. If a node is
lacking the system key, no information can be sent or received (in other words, routing
cannot be understood). This provides first level authentication of the node.
The data portion of all messages within the SPECTRA network can be encrypted
with different kinds of keys. Thus, a node needs to have knowledge of network topology
and understand network functionality in order to use the correct key for decrypting the
data portion. This provides a second level of authentication for the node and verifies that
the node understands how the SPECTRA network works. If the node lacks knowledge of
system functionality, it will be unable to identify which key to use for data decryption.
6.4 Confidentiality
SPECTRA achieves confidentiality through the use ofkeys and encryption. Every
message sent within the SPECTRA network is encrypted. In particular types ofmessages
two different keys are used. As a result, nodes must have knowledge of where to use
specific keys and when only one key is needed. This provides confidentiality,
authentication, and verifies node identity.
In situations when SPECTRA uses two different keys to encrypt a message, the
source node needs to have knowledge of both types of keys and the order to use them.
This ensures confidentiality and node identity. The receiving node also requires access to
both keys and knowledge on how to decrypt the message. If the message is read
successfully, the receiving node transmits an ACK message, informing the source of the
successful communication.
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6.5 Node Compromise
The SPECTRA network can have two types of node compromise. In one
situation, the node misses the latest system key due to wireless errors and can no longer
function in the system since its routing header cannot be decrypted. This node is ignored
and eventually removed by the system and will be unable to reenter the SPECTRA
network. In the second situation, nodes miss the system key due to an enemy trying to
infiltrate the network by physically compromising the node. This node is unable to renter
the SPECTRA network because it missed the latest system key broadcast. The value of
global broadcast can be seen in this situation. This is done in order to ensure security.
SPECTRA does not distinguish between compromised nodes and nodes that have
dropped out due to wireless errors, therefore both situations are handled in the same way.
6.5.1 Node failure due to wireless errors
Nodes are assumed to be compromised when they fail to respond to a message
that has been resent to them 5 times (fail to ACK 5 times). The node that detects this
broadcasts a removal message, encrypted with the system key, which notifies the
SPECTRA network of the compromise. The removal message results in the removal of
the compromised node from all routing tables of the system. This includes all routes that
contain the compromised node. For more detail regarding the removal message see
section 3.8.4.3.
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6.6 Clusterhead Compromise
Like nodes, CHs can be compromised or drop out due to wireless errors. Both
situations are treated in the same manner and the CH is removed from the system. A
compromised or dropped out CH causes problems for the cluster that it was controlling.
In response to this problem, the BS tells the nodes of that cluster to re-organize and
appoint a new CH.
6.6.1 Clusterhead failure due to wireless errors
CHs are assumed to be compromised when they fail to respond to a message that
has been resent 5 times to them (fail to ACK 5 times). The detecting node or CH
generates a removal message, encrypted with the system key, which is broadcast to the
SPECTRA network. The removal message informs all receiving parties of the
compromise. This message results in the removal of the compromised CH from all
routing tables and routes in the system. It is important to note that it is far harder to spoof
a removal message then inject noise into the system. In order to spoof the message,
encryption keys must be broken and used before the system refreshes. Noise saturation of
the network is something that is handled in the physical layer of the network stack and
outside the scope of this work. Formore detail regarding the removalmessage see section
3.8.4.3.
6.6.2 Cluster Re-Organization
When a CH is compromised and detected, a removal message is broadcast to the
system. The BS generates a Re-Organization message in response to this removal
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message, and broadcasts it to the corresponding cluster (see Figure 22). This message
informs the cluster to re-organize itself and appoint the node with the largest remaining
power as the new CH. The newly appointed CH then broadcasts itself to the cluster
backbone via a Cluster advertisement message (see Figure 23).
/ Re-Organize Cluster in response "'.
\ to Cluster-Head Compromise/Failure J
Re-Organize ClusterMessage- Base-Station
Re-Organize Cluster
Message
Re-Organize Cluster Message
Figure 22: Diagram depictingRe-organize clusterMessage in response to a RemovalMessage
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Cluster has Re-Organized, Node with largest \
remaining power is new Cluster-Head
Base-Station
Cluster Organization
Report
Cluster Advertisement-, , Advertising to other Cluster-
Heads in backbone
Removed from all \
Routing tables j
Newly Appointed Cluster-Head
Node with largest remaining power
Figure 23: Nodes have Re-Organized themselves and new node has sent a Cluster advertisement and a
Cluster-Organization Report
6.7 Summary
Given a WSN, it is vital to have an adaptive security protocol, as mentioned in
Chapter 2. This chapter focused on how security is provided within the SPECTRA
network during initial system setup and post system setup. This only covers security
within a static network. However, SPECTRA is an adaptive security protocol and
responds to the dynamic topology natural to a WSN. The following chapter focuses on
how SPECTRA is adaptive and its responses to topology changes.
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Chapter 7. Adaptive Security to dynamic WSN topology
As mentioned in Chapter 2, dynamic topology is an inherent feature ofWSNs due
to their resource limitations, in particular power limitations. Therefore, it is imperative
that a protocol be scalable and expandable in response to the dynamic topology ofWSNs.
SPECTRA was designed to be robust in network scalability and expansion. The limited
battery lifetimes ofnodes and CHs ensure the eventual death of every node in the system.
As nodes fail from lack of power, system performance degrades. If no action is taken, the
system will eventually cease to function.
To ensure continued system functionality, new nodes and CHs must be deployed
as the system ages to replace the nodes and CHs that have died. Node death and the
deployment of additional nodes result in a continuously changing network topology.
These changes in network topology complicate the routing of messages within the
network.
The most important challenge to a security protocol is ensuring that the security
of the network is not compromised by node failure and addition. Security is guaranteed
by requiring that all nodes joining the network after the initial system setup phase
authenticate themselves with the BS.
This chapter focuses on how nodes and CHs are added to an existing SPECTRA
network in a secure fashion (expansion ofnetwork after initial deployment).
7.1 Post-Deployment Authentication
Nodes joining the SPECTRA network after the initial system setup phase has
completed, need to authenticate themselves to acquire the latest system key. Nodes trying
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to join the SPECTRA network are deployed with a personal key that is used to
authenticate the node to the BS (each personal key may be used only once to request the
system key). Authentication is achieved when the node sending a message to the BS
requests to join the existing network, encrypted with the node's personal key and initial
system key. If the personal key is valid and has not been used for authentication before,
the BS replies with the latest system key, encrypted with the requesting nodes personal
key and initial key. Once the node has acquired the latest system key, it attempts to find
and join the nearest cluster by broadcasting a cluster joining message (see section
3.8.2.5), encrypted with the system key.
Like nodes, CHs trying to join an existing SPECTRA network need to be
authenticated. CHs are authenticated in the same way as nodes by sending a request to
join message to the BS, encrypted with its personal key. If the CH is successfully
authenticated, the BS replies with the latest system key, encrypted with the CHs personal
key and initial key. Once the CH has been authenticated it sends a message to the BS
requesting a new cluster key, encrypted with the system key. With the cluster key and the
latest system key, the CH now proceeds to organize a cluster (see section 4.2). A more
detailed overview ofnode addition and CH addition can be found in sections 7.2 and 7.3.
7.2 Node-Addition
Nodes trying to add themselves to an existing SPECTRA network need to
undergo authentication. Once authenticated, the node broadcasts a cluster joining
message, encrypted with the system key. CHs reply to the request with their cluster ID
and cluster key, encrypted with the system key. The node keeps track of the RSS of all
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replies and joins the cluster with the highest RSS (closest cluster). All information
regarding other clusters is removed, and only the cluster key from the cluster that is
joined is kept. The node ID of the new node is then added to the cluster member registry
of the CH which is eventually forwarded to the BS (in the cluster organization report).
7.3 Clusterhead-Addition
Once a joining CH has been authenticated by the BS and acquired both a system
key and a new cluster key, it proceeds to set up a cluster. The CH broadcasts a Cluster-
Advertisement message that is encrypted with the system key. Any node that receives a
stronger signal from the new CH compared to the signal from their current CH replies
with a clusterjoining message, encrypted with the system key. This message is broadcast
and contains the node ID and the CH ID. This message is broadcast, and therefore all
CHs will receive it. This enables the node's current CH to remove the node from its
cluster member registry, and the new CH adds that node to its registry. Eventually the BS
is notified of this change through a cluster organization report.
7.4 Node Death
When a node's available power drops below a certain threshold, that node sends a
Node Death message to its CH. The CH then sets a timer to three times the predicted
remaining lifetime of the node. The timer is set to three times the predicted lifetime
because survey work has shown that most nodes die within this timer [45]. Once this
timer expires the CH removes this node from its cluster member registry and broadcasts a
notification to its cluster. This message instructs all nodes in the cluster to eliminate the
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dying node from their routing tables. Node death handling is completed when the dead
node has been removed from all routing tables and the cluster member registry. Nodes
may sometimes be removed prematurely because they happen to last longer then the
expected timer. However, SPECTRA eliminates nodes in order to maintain security.
7.5 Clusterhead Death
CH death is handled in a similar fashion to node death. When a CH reaches a
certain power level, it sends a message to the BS notifying it of its state. The BS sets a
timer for three times the predicted remaining lifetime of the CH. When the timer expires,
the BS uses a broadcast to notify the corresponding cluster that its CH has died. This
causes the nodes in the cluster to re-organize themselves and appoint the node with the
largest remaining power to be the new CH. For more information on cluster re
organization, see section 6.6.2.
7.6 Summary
The focus of this chapter was on adaptive security in response to a dynamic
topology. Coupled with Chapter 6, a complete understanding of security within
SPECTRA is now achieved. The earlier chapters: Chapters 3, 4, and 5 provided a
thorough understanding ofnetwork components, setup, and functionality. Together, all of
these chapters provide a picture of SPECTRA and the inner workings of it. Now that
SPECTRA is understood in its entirety, the next step is to simulate the protocol and better
understand the benefits along with the advantages over other protocols. The practicality
of a protocol cannot be determined until an analysis has been conducted. In the case of
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SPECTRA, a simulation analysis was conducted in order to determine its validity and
benefits. Chapter 8 focuses on how SPECTRA was simulated and the tools that were
used.
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Chapter 8. Simulator Overview
SPECTRA was implemented through a Java-based simulation engine. The
simulation engine is comprised of JiST [2] (Java in Simulation Time), and SWANS [3]
(Scalable Wireless Ad-hoc Networks Simulator). These particular simulation tools were
used due to the lack of available simulation tools for WSNs. Out of the prominently
existing simulators, these tools provide a more accurate way of tracking time and a more
modular interface. Natively the tools are designed for Ad-hoc sensor networks, therefore
requiring pervasive modification to be suitable for WSNs.
It is important to understand the individual tools: JiST and SWANS that are used
for the simulation along with the simulation design and setup. This gives a better
understanding of the simulation results and makes it easier for analysis. JiST was created
to simulate time in Java, while SWANS was created to simulate scalable Ad Hoc
networks. The rest of this chapter is devoted to understanding the tools that were used in
creating the simulation and the implementation itself.
8.1 JiST
JiST was used to create the concept of time within the simulation as well as the
tracking of objects (entities) and their current state. JiST is a Java based simulation
framework. To implement a simulation in Java through JiST, the programmer must break
down the simulation model into the primary simulation objects. Once all the primary
simulation objects are determined and broken up, each of these are implemented in a Java
class or an entity as JiST calls it. Each class or entity can keep track of its own state,
enabling the simulation model to track the state of the object (represented by a class or
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entity) within the simulation. Post compilation, JiST rewrites the byte code associated
with each class that represents an object in the simulation model [2]. In doing this, JiST
replaces recursive method invocations with code that schedules the method to be called
during a certain period of time within the simulation, resulting in an event [2]. This
particular feature allows for the creation of infinite recursive functions. However,
exceptions do not occur since an infinite recursive call is no longer functioning in its
native nature but rather as a continuous event. As a result, JiST allows the programmer to
create continuous events without crashing the system or the simulation.
8.1.1 Simulation Time in JiST
The idea of time is implemented in JiST by creating what is known as Simulation
Time. The concept of simulation time was created to control the progress of the clock
while the simulation is running. This allows for a more accurate timing analysis
compared to current simulators. Current simulators may provide adequate models of
network topology, but they depend on the system clock to determine the efficiency of the
network topology, MAC protocol, routing protocol, etc [2]. Because current simulators
are dependent on the system clock, an accurate estimation of time can only be achieved if
the simulation can model time based on the runtime. However, attempting to simulate
real time by modifying code to run on a virtual machine is practically impossible due to
external optimization techniques that are utilized by various virtual machines. Java
imposes more problems due to its implementation of garbage collection (recovers unused
memory) tactics that are sporadic and occasional. This process adds unexpected
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processing time to the simulation runtime and cannot be compensated for because of its
intermittency and variability in amount of time.
JiST implements what is known as "simulation time" which allows the written
code to influence or stop the clock. Simulation time allows the programmer to directly
control the amount of "time" required by any given process for the purpose of efficiency
calculations. This also allows the programmer to schedule the order and the moment in
which an event will take place. Time can therefore be modified according to different
microprocessors because the ability to control the amount of time required for a given
process is now possible. This allows the programmer to benchmark the simulation over
various processors if their timing information is available. This is extremely important for
a WSN because processor efficiency is extremely important, resulting in the possibility of
a comparison analysis. The functionality of scheduling events is also very beneficial to
WSNs, which may have a number of nodes performing various operations in different
layers simultaneously.
8.2 SWANS
SWANS is a high-performance WSN simulator that is based on JiST. SWANS
was used to create the actual WSN network and communication routes between all nodes
and clusters within the network. SWANS is mainly responsible for creating the acting
objects within a WSN network (nodes, CHs, etc.) as well as defining their network layers.
Nodes and CH objects are created by SWANS and simply exist within the simulation by
being attached to the field, therefore existing within the field [3]. SWANS also breaks
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down each node object into its various network layers: Radio (physical), MAC, Routing,
Transport, and Application, creating an entity for each (see Figure 24 below).
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Figure 24: SWANS architecture |3]
SWANS does not natively have a function or layer that tracks energy. The tool
also does not include generic protocols for each protocol layer it supports. Therefore, in
order to conduct the simulations for SPECTRA, SWANS was reworked to support the
necessary functions. A battery layer was added in order to keep track of energy during
simulation runtime. In order to do this, the SWANS simulator was extensively modified
because battery support needs to be present whenever simulation functions are conducted.
Therefore, at every point of the simulation, energy depletion had to be supported. Along
with the addition of a battery object, simple protocols were implemented for every
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protocol layer that was needed for simulations. The implemented protocols were: a
simple MAC protocol and an application layer protocol for both nodes and the BS.
All protocol layers within SWANS are implemented with a certain level of
abstraction, which allows them to be completely independent. Since SPECTRA is a
routing and security protocol it was implemented in the routing layer of the SWANS
objects. In case certain layers are dependent on one another they can be associated by
implementing the layers as "helper" classes. Another robust aspect of SWANS is the idea
of both nodes and CH objects. In the case that the particular protocol being implemented
does not use CHs and nodes, SWANS allows the programmer to ignore the CH object.
This makes SWANS an extremely robust and practical engine to use for various WSN
architectures [3].
SWANS is also ideal for WSN simulation since it is a high performance and
scalable simulation engine. For every message transmitted within a WSN simulation, the
simulator needs to determine all nodes that are affected by it, either by receiving the
message, sensing it, or receiving interference from it. Most simulators do a linear search
through all the available radios, resulting in a huge overhead and an extremely slow
simulation run-time. Instead, SWANS breaks the field into quad tree representation (a
hierarchal decomposition into squares), reducing the search effort for the affected nodes
and receptors of a transmission [3].
8.3 Wireless SensorNetwork implementation in JiST/SWANS
JiST and SWANS provide a good starting point for implementation of a WSN.
JiST provides the core simulation engine, and SWANS implements both an efficient
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Field for propagating messages and a complete network stack. However, certain design
limitations in the base distribution of SWANS create challenges in developing a WSN
simulator.
In order to support network layer interchangeability, SWANS defines a standard
interface for each layer. This lends the extra advantage that the interface for each layer is
not bound by the constraints placed on JiST entity classes. In fact, this is necessary so
that method calls that cross layer interface boundaries can still be implemented. Because
a class implementing one layer does not know what class will be implementing adjacent
layers, only that class must implement the interface.
There are however, certain problems generated by the SWANS layer interface
definitions. First, they represent a full-fledged IP stack, providing the application layer
with sockets and allowing formultiple network interfaces (between the network layer and
one or more MAC layers). In a WSN, such a powerful, general-purpose network stack is
unnecessary. There is most likely only one application, one routing protocol, and one pair
ofMAC/Physical layers.
Another problem caused by the SWANS layer interfaces is that they name the
specific types of addresses that various network layers use. The MAC layer is constrained
to use 48-bit MAC addresses, and the Network layer uses 32-bit IP addresses. In a WSN,
it is better for all layers to use a single type of address since pre-deployment procedures
can guarantee that all the addresses are unique. Furthermore, depending on the size of the
network, these addresses can easily be reduced to eight or 1 6 bits. SWANS also restricts
the message types that can be passed across these interfaces, requiring full IP headers at
the network layer, etc., and not allowing for additional fields easily.
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Although useful in an IP stack, a network layer is unnecessary for determining
which network interface to use. WSNs need only a routing protocol between the transport
and MAC layer, and in this case a security protocol. Similarly, the transport layer itself
(and the multiple ports and sockets it can provide to applications) is unnecessary. There
are only a few applications for which it would be convenient to communicate directly
with the network layer, and 100% end-to-end reliability of application messages is
difficult.
Finally there are some features missing in SWANS that are necessary for a useful
study of WSNs. It does not allow for the transmission strength of a transmitter to be
changed after it is created, and there is no support for a battery model, or any form of
power consumption tracking. SWANS was modified in order to support this
functionality, as described in the following sections.
8.3.1 SPECTRA Layers
The layers in SPECTRA are organized as follows:
1 . The Field (medium) is provided by SWANS.
2. The Radio forwards the received signal strength to theMAC and Net layers,
and tracks power usage when transmitting and receiving. (Provided by
SWANS)
3. The MAC Layer is a simple CSMA scheme that is provided by SWANS.
4. The Network layer combines the functionality of a routing layer and the
security protocol. (Implemented)
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5. Two application layers were written: one for the BS (Sink), and one for the
remainder of the nodes, including CHs. (Implemented)
8.3.1.1 MAC Layer
The MAC layer is responsible for sending messages, avoiding collisions, and
guaranteeing that packets are transmitted for one hop. It implements a simple CSMA
collision avoidance protocol. When sending a message, the MAC layer waits for a
random time up to 20 bytes (0.16 ms). This spreads out messages which would otherwise
be occurring at the exact same time, such as responses to a broadcast. Then the MAC
layer checks the current state of the radio to see if it is OK to transmit. If not, then the
MAC layer backs off for a random time between 1000 and 1300 characters (8-10.4 ms)
before checking again. This delay is unnecessarily large, but high performance is not
needed and fine-tuning theMAC layer is beyond the scope of this work.
Once the MAC layer detects that the channel is free, it sends the message and
begins waiting for an acknowledgement packet. If it receives an ACK signals the network
layer that it is free to transmit the next packet. If it does not receive an ACK within 40 ms,
it tries to resend, backing off as necessary while the channel is blocked.
8.3.1 .2 Routing/Security Layer
The routing and security layer is the foundation of SPECTRA. All security is
provided at this layer, in a fashion that is transparent to the application layer. All of the
keys are held in the security layer of SPECTRA. Information about a nodes position and
role in the SPECTRA system, such as lists of neighbors, if the node is a CH, and what
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nodes are in the same cluster are held in the routing layer. The routing layer insures that
the system organizes itself correctly into clusters, and establishes routes. It keeps track of
routing tables, and deals with all messages related to the operation of the system and
message routing.
8.3.1 .3 Application Layer
There are two Application layer classes, one for the BS (BSApp) and one for the
remainder of the nodes (NodeApp). NodeApp thus handles both CHs and ordinary sensor
nodes.
8.3.1.3.1 Base-station
The BS application layer is the originator of data requests, which are directed to a
single CH. It is also responsible for periodically instructing its network layer to broadcast
a new system key.
8.3.1.3.2 Clusterhead
At the application layer, a CH is responsible for reporting aggregated data to the
BS, both periodically and to fulfill a specific request, and requesting and aggregating data
from its cluster's nodes. It also forwards node death messages from ordinary nodes to the
BS.
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8.3.1.3.3 Node
At the application layer, an ordinary node is only responsible for generating
periodic data traffic, responses to specific requests, and informing its CH if it is low on
power and about to die.
8.3.2 Event entry points
In order to provide a road map for the source code documentation, a list of events
that may be scheduled during the course of the simulation is given. For each event, the
scheduling circumstances and responsibilities are as stated. All major events/functions
implemented for each layer can be seen in Tables 3-7. A detailed description of each
function can be found in the appendix.
Field
Function Name Functionality/Use
void transmit()
Creates a transmission in the field
and determines nodes in the field
Radio
void setPower()
Adjusts the transmitting power and
updates the node battery object
void transmit()
Initiates transmission, simulates
delay, and calculates energy usage
void endTransmit()
Resets radio state to minimize
power usage
void receive()
Turns on at the beginning of
transmit,
calculates power usage for receive
void endReceiveQ End receive and calculates power
Table 3: Field Functions
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MAC
Function Name Functionality/Use
setRadioMode()
Called to update MAC layer on
radio's current state
void receive()
Called when a receive has
occurred.
MAC layer determines destination
void setRadioPower() Changes transmission strength
void acknowledge() Called to send an ACK to sender
void sendMessage()
Performs backoffs, sends the
message if the medium is clear, and
waits for acknowledgement
void forgetMessage()
Invoked after a specific delay to
clear
messages in the received list
void send()
Called by network layer to send any
packet other than an acknowledge
Table 4: MAC Layer Functions
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Network Layer
Function Name Functionality/Use
void receive()
Called by the application layer when
receiving a message. Responsible
for decrypting incoming messages.
void send()
Called by the application layer when
a message is being sent.
Responsible for encrypting outgoing
messages.
void pump()
Retrieves next message that the
routing layer is waiting to transmit
void broadcastCHAuthenticationRequest()
Sends initial authentication request
that every CH must send to the BS
void broadcastAuthenticationRequest()
Sends initial authentication request
that every node must send to the
BS
void broadcastRf?EQ()
Called when a route needs to be
established to some destination
void broadcastClusterJoin()
This message joins a node to a
cluster and notifies its neighbor
nodes
void broadcastClusterAdvertisement()
CHs send this message to nodes
informing them they can join its
cluster
void broadcastNodeRemoval()
Message is sent by a node that
discovers one of its neighbor nodes
is missing
void joinCluster()
Determines which cluster to join
based on signal strengths
void start()
Initiates first authentication attempt
at system startup
void refreshSystemKey() Initiates a refresh of the system key
void unableToContactNeighbor()
Notifies that a neighbor has failed to
respond 5 re-try attempts and
initiates a removal
Table 5: Network Layer Functions
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Node Application Layer
Function Name Functionality/Use
void receive()
Receive is called in response to a
message received by the app layer
void send_aggregated_data()
Event scheduled after the first node
responds to a request
void clear_request()
Occurs after a period of time after a
sendaggregated. Clears late
replies
void check_battery()
Checks battery level, if less than
5% message is sent
void mn()
Starts nodes periodic operations
and start up actions.
Table 6: Node Application Layer Functions
BS Application Layer
Function Name Functionality/Use
void requestLoopQ
Sends a request at random to a
CH for its aggregated data
void systemKeyLoopO
Periodically instructs the network
layer to update the system key in all
nodes
Table 7: BS Application Layer Functions
8.3.3 Message types
The messages are built from top to bottom by appending the current layer's header
to the message being passed down, and decomposed by the reverse process. Thus the
simplest message is one created by the MAC layer, and the most complex is one created
by the application layer. For uniformity and simplicity of design, all packet fields are 16
bit signed integers to match the address size. All messages implemented for each
simulation layer can be found in Tables 6 and 7. A detailed description of each message
can be found in the appendix.
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Net Layer Messages
Function Name Functionality/Use
ROUT_RREQ Used to establish a new route in the network
ROUT_f?RP Convey the new route back to the requesting node,
eavesdropped by other nodes
APP_MSG Primarily used for data transmission and aggregation
APP_MSG_BCAST
Same as APP_MSG except broadcast to all nodes instead
of a particular node
CMD_FIRST_GROUP_KEY Reply sent by BS in response to authentication requests.
CMD_REFRESH_GROUP_KEY Primary method of continuous authentication within the
SPECTRA network.
CMD_NEW_CLUSTER_KEY
Sent whenever a cluster needs to distribute a new cluster
key to its nodes. Used to refresh the cluster key after a
node in the cluster has been compromised.
CLUSTER_ADVERTISEMENT
Nodes record the RSS with which they receive this
message, and join the CH from which they received the
highest RSS.
CLUSTER_NODE_JOINS Informs the CH that the node is joining the cluster.
SEC_NODE
Initial request for authentication from a node to the BS. BS
replies with a CMD_FIRST_GROUP_KEY message.
SEC_CH
Initial request for authentication from a CH to the BS. BS
replies with a CMD_FIRST_GROUP_KEY message.
NODE_REMOVAL
This message informs all recipients to remove the missing
node from their routing tables, and if a CH receives this
message, it will refresh its cluster key because the old
cluster key may be compromised.
CLUSTER_REORG
This command is sent by the BS when it discovers that
one of it's CHs is gone. The nodes that used to belong to
the now missing CH must join nearby clusters.
REFRESH_CLUSTER_KEY
Called by the CH when it discovers that one of its nodes is
missing and has perhaps been compromised.
Table 8: Net Layer Messages
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Application Layer Messages
Function Name Functionality/Use
short NODE_DATA = 100
Data sent from a node to its CH on a periodic basis, not
associated with a specific BS request.
short CH_DATA = 101 Aggregated data sent from a CH to the BS, not associated
with a particular request.
short NODE_RESPONSE =102
Data sent from a node to its CH in response to a specific
request.
short CH_RESPONSE = 103
Aggregated data sent from the CH to the BS in response
to a specific request.
short CH_REQUEST = 104 Request for data from the BS to a CH.
short NODE REQUEST = 105 Request for data from a CH to one or all of its nodes.
short BEGIN_MONITOR =106
Instruction for a node or CH to start making periodic
reports of data.
short END_MONITOR = 107
Instruction for a node or CH to stop making periodic
reports of data.
short NODE_DEATH =108 Notification that a node is low on power.
Table 9: Application LayerMessages
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Chapter 9. Security Performance Analysis
The feasibility of a proposed protocol cannot be determined until some sort of
analysis has been conducted. In the case of SPECTRA, a simulation analysis of the
protocol was done in order to determine its validity and benefits. The topology of the
network in the simulations is dynamic and determined at run time. In order to reduce this
variability the simulations were run with the same parameters 100 times, and the results
averaged. Simulations were conducted by varying only one metric in order to compare
the results and reduce the effect of other aspects. The following metrics were used for
protocol performance analysis: number of nodes and CHs, battery size (initial battery
size), average energy depletion, packet size, encryption levels, and the overhead of
encryption levels. A detailed description of the metrics can be seen below.
Number of nodes and CHs: the effect on the network lifetime as nodes are added
and CHs are added, (how scalable is the network, can either nodes and CHs be
added without adding the other type)
Battery size: the effect of the initial battery size on network lifetime, (do both CH
and node batteries need to be increased together)
Average energy depletion: how energy is consumed over the course of the
network lifetime, (where is energy consumed more)
Packet size: how scalable is the protocol for other applications where larger
packets are required.
Encryption levels: how different levels of encryption effect the overall network
lifetime, (how much of a difference is there between 64 bit and 128 bit
encryption)
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Overhead of encryption levels: what is computational intensity of encryption
and its effect on the network.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, this work shows the benefits of the proposed protocol by
showing the reduction in energy consumption through simulations. Because there is a
lack of current work in this particular technique, a comparative analysis is extremely
difficult. However, the energy consumption of traditional protocols that do not integrate
routing and security can be compared. The following tables show the energy
consumption of the SPINS Security Protocol [30], the Pairwise security protocol [30],
and the Pebblenets protocol [30] utilizing the same battery as seen in this work3.
Consumption
Type
Node Energy
(mW)
System Lifetime
(hours)
Communication 128
3.5Computation 23
Total 151
Table 10: SPINS Protocol Energy Consumption |30J
Consumption
Type
Node Energy
(raW)
System Lifetime
(hours)
Communication 236
.5Computation 36
Total 272
Table 11: Pairwise Security Protocol Energy Consumption [30]
Consumption
Type
Node Energy
(mW)
System Lifetime
(hours)
Communication 31
7.5Computation 1.63
Total 32.63
Table 12: Pebblenets Protocol Energy Consumption [30]
Assuming a CR2032 watch battery with an output of300mAh
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9.1 Results and Analysis
An extremely important aspect of any security protocol is the effect it has on
energy depletion of a network. It is a greater issue in the SPECTRA protocol because the
energy depletion of the network decides the difference between the initial battery size of
a CH and node. Figure 27 shows the average energy depletion of nodes and CHs over
time in a given simulation. The topography of the network can be seen in Figure 25,
while the backbone of the network can be seen in Figure 26. Figures 24 and 25 are
examples of what a typical WSN will look like for the following simulations. In the
beginning and in the end ofFigure 27, the slopes are greater when compared to the center
part. This is because routing and system setup is being conducted in the beginning, and
therefore more messages are passed between nodes and CHs. In the end, more energy is
expelled because nodes and CHs are dying out, and therefore low battery messages are
being sent as well as rerouting into other clusters.
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It is important to understand how the network size in terms of the ratio of CHs to
nodes effects the system lifetime. Figure 28 shows the effect nodes have on the overall
lifetime of a given SPECTRA network. In this particular case, CHs were kept constant
while the number of nodes was varied. As nodes increase, the network ratio changes and
the overall system lifetime decreases. With more nodes in the system, the overall routing
and setup time of the system increases, which is the area where energy is depleted faster
(mainly the beginning and end parts ofFigure 27 are increased). With more nodes, cluster
sizes are increased (as seen by the lowered ratio), creating a larger overhead for the
average CH. Therefore, when nodes in a system are increased after a certain threshold
system lifetime decreases.
Nodes vs System Life Time
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Figure 28: Change in overall system lifetime due to the number of nodes (varied ratio)
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The figure below shows the effect of CHs on the lifetime of a given SPECTRA
system. In this particular simulation, the nodes are kept constant while the number of
CHs is varied (resulting in an increased network ratio). As demonstrated, there is an
equilibrium number of CHs that should be in the system. This is because after a certain
number ofCHs, additional CHs cause problems because clusters are too small, data isn't
being correlated anymore, and nodes don't have multi-hop paths to their CH. As a result,
nodes expend more energy communicating with their CHs, and CHs communicate more
with the BS because aggregation is more frequent. As can be seen in the figure below, it
is likely that the highest point of the trend is the optimum ratio for a network consisting
of a given number ofnodes and clusterheads. Figure 29 shows that a favorable number of
CHs for a network consisting of 100 nodes is 10 (network ratio of .1).
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The lifetime of a given entity is dependent on the battery utilized. Larger batteries
result in an increased system and node lifetime. However, when a larger battery is
utilized for a given entity in the system, a larger battery will also be needed for other
parts of the system. It can be seen in Figure 30 and Figure 31 that when either the node or
CH battery is held constant, the variable battery can only be increased to a certain level
before it is useless. In the case where the CH's battery is kept constant, the node battery
can increase only to the point where the CH becomes the limiting factor in the lifetime.
The same situation occurs as the CH battery is varied, and the nodes' kept constant. After
a certain threshold, the system dies because the nodes lack power. Therefore, it is
important to keep a ratio that increases the system lifetime and keeps the dependency of
lifetime not on the entities, but rather the system topography.
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99
550
490
S. 470
ai
E
s 450
3
I 430
390
350
Initial Clusterhead Battery Life vs System Life Time
250
|BCH Battery |
300 350 400
Initial Clusterhead Battery Life (uW)
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The packet size within a system greatly affects network lifetime. A larger packet
size increases the information being transmitted, resulting in a longer on state for the
transceiver. As packet sizes increase, overall system lifetime decreases, as can be seen in
Figure 32 below.
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Figure 32: The effect of packet sizes on network lifetime
The most important effect on system lifetime of a security algorithm is the effect
that encryption has on power consumption. As can be seen in Figure 33 (below), the
effect of encryption on power consumption is exponential. Increases in the level of
encryption double the power consumption required for encrypting a packet. In other
words, 64 bit encryption requires twice as much power as 32 bit encryption. Power usage
increases drastically because encryption is used at every point in the SPECTRA network.
It is important to note the amount of power consumption related to the battery capacity.
As can be seen by Figure 33, the amount of power consumed for encryption is fairly
minimal compared to the overall battery capacity. Therefore, even though higher levels of
encryption require farmore power, the power consumed by encryption is far less than the
power consumed by communication overhead.
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Figure 33: Power consumption associated with different encryption levels
The effect encryption has on overall system lifetime is actually greater than
doubling. This is caused by encryption being used in every aspect of the system, both in
decrypting and encrypting any kind ofmessage. Therefore, the encryption of a particular
packet doubles, but the overall system lifetime decreases by more than half. This can be
seen in Figure 34 below.
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Figure 34: The effect of encryption on network lifetime
Analysis of the results show the practicality of the SPECTRA protocol for WSN
applications. Traditional security protocols that do not integrate routing and security run
for a few hours utilizing mWs of power (Tables 10-12 [30]). SPECTRA on the other
hand is extremely power efficient, running for hours on a few pW of power. The results
also show the scalable and adaptive nature of SPECTRA. SPECTRA can employ various
levels of encryption with little effect on power consumption. It can easily be scaled for
different network sizes without drastically varying power consumption. SPECTRA is
also adaptive in network communication procedures, allowing for different packet sizes.
This allows the protocol to be implemented in various applications. The results prove that
SPECTRA is an effective security protocol that achieves scalability, adaptive security,
routing, all at a low cost to power.
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Chapter 10. Conclusions and Future Work
One of the most challenging topics in WSNs is security due to the ad hoc nature,
intermittent connectivity, and resource limitations of WSNs. Current solutions to the
security issue in WSNs were created with only authentication and confidentiality in mind.
This is far from optimal, because routing and security are closely correlated. Routing and
security are alike because similar steps are taken in order to achieve these functions
within a given network. Therefore, security and routing can be combined together in a
cross-layer design, reducing the consumption ofresources.
This work integrated routing and key management in order to provide an energy
efficient security and routing solution. To achieve this, the following features were
implemented: integration of security and routing, dynamic security, robust re-keying,
low-complexity, and dual levels of encryption. This work combined all the robust
features of current security implementations while adding additional features like dual
layer encryption, resulting in an extremely efficient security protocol. SPECTRA was
designed to provide all of these features while decreasing the effect on network lifetime
by its low power nature.
Aggressive analysis of the simulation results shows the practicality of the
SPECTRA protocol and its low operating cost in power consumption. The simulation
results show the lifetime of a given SPECTRA network in hours when utilizing only 2
hundredths percent of a watch
battery4 (a few pW of power). Given the lifetime of the
network on a small percentage of power that will be allocated in actuality, shows the
potential lifetime of the network. The power overhead associated with SPECTRA is
Assuming a CR2032 watch battery with an output of300mAh
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relatively little when compared to nonintegrated approaches to routing and security
(Tables 10-12), making SPECTRA extremely power efficient and increasing network
lifetime.
Packet size has a large effect on the network lifetime because a WSN is based on
data transmission and reception. Larger packets require larger transmission and receiving
times, resulting in a noticeable effect on network lifetime. Therefore, it is pertinent to
choose the size of a system packet carefully. The smallest packet that can be utilized to
get the network functions done is most useful because it increases network lifetime.
The cross-layered approach to the SPECTRA protocol benefits a network by
decreasing energy consumption, increasing network lifetime. A cross-layered approach
also reduces the number of protocols needed and combines communication to benefit
multiple layers. This is achieved by conducting routing and security set up
simultaneously, combining the two layers and the communication needed. This reduces
power consumption and superfluous communication for routing and security.
It is important to understand that security in SPECTRA is changeable or flexible.
This allows a specific network to implement higher security levels, through bigger keys,
if the application requires it. As the results showed, system lifetime degrades as security
is increased, due to the overhead associated with encrypting and decrypting larger keys.
Though larger keys add to the computation overhead, this overhead is small when
compared to network communication. Transmission and reception of data packets
consume far more power then computations. Though it is important to understand
computation overhead in a security protocol is seen over and over again because
encryption is used on every packet. Therefore, not only must a packet be encrypted but
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also decrypted. In the end, larger keys do affect power but the effective consumption is
small when compared to transmission/reception consumption. It is important to use the
level of encryption that is required for the environment that the network will be in.
SPECTRA has been proven to be an effective security protocol that achieves
scalability, adaptive security, routing, all at a low cost to power. The adaptive security
can be seen in the level of encryption and in the ability to adapt to network topology
changes. SPECTRA allows for a network to run for days on less than 1 percent of the
battery capacity5(a few pW of power), where traditional implementations run for hours
on mW of power (Tables 10-12 [30]). SPECTRA is robust in its implementation,
features, and utility. The protocol is ideal for low power, adaptive networks that require a
high level of security.
The next step to take in the validation of the SPECTRA protocol is to implement
it in hardware. Simulation can only provide an estimated guess ofhow the protocol works
in actuality. In order to completely understand the effect of the protocol on a network, it
needs to be implemented in an actual application and in actual hardware. Hardware
implementation also provides aspects that cannot be modeled in simulation such as
environmental aspects or mobility. With hardware implementation, the effect that other
variables have on the protocol can be analyzed. Along with a hardware implementation, it
will be useful to understand how SPECTRA works with protocols from different layers.
The SPECTRA protocol is only for a specific layer in the protocol stack. As a
result, other protocols will be implemented for the other layers. It is very likely that the
bottleneck of a network could exist in one of the other layers due to the protocol chosen.
Assuming a CR2032 watch battery with an output of300mAh
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Therefore, SPECTRA should be analyzed with protocols from other layers in order to
determine if its performance degrades with particular protocols in comparison to others.
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Appendix
A.l Field (src/jist/swans/field/Fieldlnterface.java)
void transmit (Radiolnfo srclnfo. Message msg, long duration,
double power) ;
Transmit is invoked by a node's radio to generate a transmission on the field. The
field is responsible for determining what other nodes which have been registered with it
are affected by the transmission, and will invoke radio.receive() and radio.endReceive()
appropriately.
void moveRadio (Integer id, Location loc) ;
void moveRadioOff (Integer id, Location delta);
MoveRadio and moveRadio update the underlying field structure with new
coordinates for the given node. This allows for node mobility, but is not utilized in the
current implementation of SPECTRA.
A.2 Radio (src/jist/swans/radio/RadioInterface.java)
void setPower (double power) ;
SetPower adjusts the transmitter power for the next transmission. It is called by
the MAC layer's function which is just a pass-through. The radio layer's setPower method
is also responsible for updating the transmitPower parameter in the node's battery object.
void transmit (Message msg, long delay, long duration) ;
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Transmit initiates a transmission. It simulates any delays required by the radio to
power up the transmitter, forwards the transmit event to the field layer with the
appropriate power setting, and registers the energy use with the battery. After the
message transmit duration, it invokes endTransmit to clean up the radio's state.
void endTransmit ( int sequence );
EndTransmit resets the radio's state to IDLE , SENSING, or RECEIVING after a
transmission, it is called by radio.transmit()
void receive (Message msg, Double power, Long duration) ;
Receive is invoked on a radio by the field at the beginning of a transmission (after
the propagation delay). The radio holds onto the message until endReceive is also called
by the field. During the intervening time, the radio will flag the message with an error if
it receive is called again.
void endReceive (Double power) ;
EndReceive is called by the field at the end of a transmission. The power value
given should match the power value passed to receive. Assuming the message was
transmitted without any errors, the radio forwards the message to theMAC layer.
A.3 MAC layer (src/jist/swans/MAC/MacCSMA.java)
void setRadioMode (byte mode) ;
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SetRadioMode is called by the radio whenever the radio mode changes, to apprise
the MAC layer of the change.
void peek (Message msg) ;
Peek is called by the radio on a receive event. Since this shows the packet to the
MAC layer before the data is strictly available, peek is implemented with stub code in
MacCSMA
void receive (Message msg, double power);
Receive is called by the radio when a transmission is successfully received. The
MAC layer examines the destination in the MAC header and decides whether the packet
is to be forwarded to the net layer. Packets may also be forwarded flagged as
"promiscuous" if they are not intended for the current address. If an ACK is lost, the
MAC layer may receive a packet twice, so packets are remembered for a period after they
are acknowledged. If a duplicate packet is received, the ACK is resent. ACKs are sent
immediately on reception of the packet.
void setRadioPower (double power);
SetRadioPower is called by the net layer to change the transmission strength and
thus the effective radius of communication. It simply forwards the request to the radio.
void acknowledge ( MacCSMAMessage mem ) ;
Acknowledge is called by receive to send anACK to a packet.
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void sendMessage (short seq, int backoffs, int noacks) ;
SendMessage performs the back-offs and waits for an ACK. If the medium is
clear, it sends the message immediately; otherwise it waits for a randomized delay to
resend and invokes itself. Once the packet is sent, if it needs an ACK, it waits for a
specific delay (the acknowledge timeout), and again invokes itself. If the MAC layers
acknowledge flag has been set, or the seq number has been advanced, it assumes the
packet was sent successfully.
void forge tMessage ( MessagelD mid ) ;
ForgetMessage is invoked by the receive event after a specific delay to clear an
entry in the list of received messages.
void send (Message msg, Address nextHop) ;
Send is called by the network layer to send any packet other than a MAC layer
acknowledge. It stores the message locally, waits for a short randomized delay (to avoid
repeated contention), and invokes sendMessage
A.4 Network layer (src/jist/swans/net/NetWSN.java)
void receive (Message msg, Address lastHop, byte macld,
boolean promiscuous, double rssPower_mW) ;
Receive is one of the most important methods in the routing layer, and is called
whenever the routing layer is given a packet by the MAC layer. Receive first uses the
latest system key to decrypt the routing header of the incoming packet. It then determines
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if a given message is intended for the node that has just received it, or if that message is
in a multi-hop route and needs to be forwarded to the next hop in that route.
If the message is not for the receiving node, the node will attempt to eavesdrop
the packet if it is an RREP or data message. This eliminates the need for some later
communication, and helps with data aggregation.
If the message is intended for the node, then receive decrypts the actual body of
the message, and carries out an appropriate action. There is a handler for every type of
message that the application can receive. For a list ofmessage types, see section 2.7.
The message may be handed up to the application layer. The routing layer may
also initiate a response without consulting the application layer, such as in the case of
routing messages.
void send (Message msg, Address dst, short protocol , byte
priori ty, byte ttl) ;
Send is called by the application layer, when the application layer wants to send a
message. Messages involving the application layer are generally related to data collection
or aggregation. The send method is responsible for encrypting this outgoing message, and
insuring that it gets a properly formatted routing header, containing a valid route to the
destination. If no such route to the destination is yet known, then the message is stored,
and an RREQ is broadcast to find a route.
void pump (int netid) ;
Pump is called by the routing layer to get the next message that the routing layer
is waiting to transmit. Because the MAC layer can only deal with the sending of a single
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message at a time, messages may be stored until the MAC layer is ready to send them.
The implemented MAC layer is greedy, in that once it acquires the channel and sends, it
continues to send until the sending queues are empty.
void broadcas tCHAuthen ti ca ti onReques t () ;
This method creates, formats, encrypts, and sends the initial authentication
request that every CH must send to the BS as part of authentication. This message
identifies the sender as a CH, and so the BS will also send a cluster key in response, in
addition to the system key.
void broadcas tAu then ti ca tionReques t ( ) ;
This method creates, formats, encrypts, and sends the initial authentication
request that every node must send to the BS as part of authentication. This message
identifies the sender as a node, and so it will receive only the system key in response from
theBS.
void broadcas tRREQ ( MessageShorts msgToSend ) ;
This method is called whenever any other part of the routing layer needs to
establish a route to some destination. Broadcast/?/?_> encrypts the message that it
receives, adds a routing header, encrypts and encapsulates the messages, and then adds it
to the queue for the MAC layer, such that it will be broadcast to all nearby nodes as soon
as possible.
118
The RREQ packet itself is taken as an argument to this function, and must already
be correctly formatted before this method receives it. The sending nodes ID is appended
to this RREQmessage before the message is sent to the broadcasiRREQmethod.
void broadcas tClusterJoin ( MessageShorts msgToSend );
This message serves a dual function, in that it notifies the destination cluster that
the sending node is joining the cluster, and also makes this node known to its neighbors.
This message deals with encryption and adding a correct routing header.
void broadcas tClusterAdvertisement () ;
This message is sent by CHs and informs nearby nodes that they can join its
cluster. Nodes respond with a broadcastJoin message (See directly above). Nearby CHs
also receive this message, and use it to populate their table of neighboring CHs, which
will later be used for establishing multi-hop routes to the BS.
void broadcas tNodeRemoval ( Address .WSN toRemove );
This message is sent by any node that discovers that one of its neighbor nodes is
missing. A node is found missing when it fails to respond with an ACK to a message that
has been resent to it 5 times. This message instructs all receiving parties to remove that
node from their neighbor tables, routing tables, and to invalidate keys associated with that
node. If that node is a CH, then the receipt of this message by the BS triggers a cluster-
reorganization message.
void joinCluster () ;
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This function is called in response to the expiration of a timer that is set on system
startup. This timer insures that this function will never be called until after all nodes and
CHs in the system are finished authenticating themselves and broadcasting their cluster
advertisementmessages.
This function does not actually send the message to join a cluster, but rather
chooses which CH to join, based on the cluster-advertisements that have been received.
Once a CH has been selected, this function calls broadcastClusterJoin, which can be
found above.
void start ( ) ;
This method is called when the system begins, and does nothing but initiate the
first attempt at authentication. It calls the broadcastAuthenticationRequest function that
can be found above in this section.
void refreshSys temKey ( ) ;
This method is periodically called within the routing layer of the BS, and initiates
the refreshing of the system key. This entails generating and setting a new system key,
encrypting the new system key with the old system key, and then broadcasting this
message to all nodes in the system.
void unabl eToCon tac tNeighbor ( Address . WSN neighbor ) ;
This method is called by the MAC layer, to inform the routing layer that one of
the neighbors has failed to respond over 5 re-try attempts. The unableToContactNeighbor
function deals with removing the missing node from tables, and formatting the removal
120
message to be sent. This removal message is sent by the broadcastNodeRemoval
function, found above in this section.
A.5 NodeApp (src/jist/swans/app/NodeAppInterface.java)
void recei ve ( Message msg, Address src ) ;
Receive is called by the network layer when it receives an application packet. The
application layer acts on the message based on what type it is.
void send_aggregated_data ( short reqID );
CHs will schedule this event for a specified time after the first node responds to a
request. It performs the aggregation on the data sent so far by the cluster's nodes and
sends the result to the BS.
void clear_request ( short reqID );
Send_aggregated_data schedules this event for a period of time after it sends the
aggregated data. This allows the CH to disregard late responses from the nodes and helps
prevent spurious transmissions. After this event, the CH has completely forgotten about
the request.
void check_ba 1 1ery () ;
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All nodes run checkbattery in a recursive loop to monitor their energy supply.
When the energy left drops below a certain threshold (currently 5% of the starting
energy) it sends a message to the BS indicating that it is low on power and about to die.
void run ( ) ;
The run event is called by the driver program when the node is constructed. It is
responsible for kicking off the node's periodic actions and performing startup actions.
There are currently no startup actions.
A.6 BSApp (src/jist/swans/app/BSAppInterface.java)
The BS app layer has some functionality in common with the node app layer.
Only the features unique to the BS are described here.
void requestLoop () ;
Kicked offby run(), requestLoop periodically sends a request to a random CH for
its aggregated data.
void sys temKeyLoop ( ) ;
Kicked off by run(), systemKeyLoop periodically instructs the network layer to
update the system key in all nodes.
A.7 MAC Layer messages
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The MAC layer only has two types of messages: Data messages sent by the
routing layer and acknowledge packets. The MAC Header has four fields: source address,
destination address, sequence number, and payload size. The source and destination
addresses indicate the current hop, so one should be the current node's address, and the
other should be a neighbor. The sequence number is a 1 6-bit counter specific to the node,
so the tuple (seq, srcAddr) serves to uniquely identify a message until the counter wraps.
A. 8 Net LayerMessages
ROU7RREQ
Used to establish new routes in the system. This message is broadcast to all
nearby nodes, and then resent by everyone who receives it until it is received by the
destination. The destination then sends a RREP is response.
ROUTJIREP
Used to convey a new route back to the node that requested that route. This
message is issued in response to an RREQ by a node that received an RREQ intended for
it. This message is eavesdropped by all nodes who can hear it.
APP MSG
Used primarily for data transmission and aggregation, but also used for any
communication between the application layers of neighboring nodes. The contents of
these messages are unknown to the routing and security layer.
APP MSG BCAST
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Same as an APP MSG, except that they are broadcast to all nodes, rather than
directed to particular nodes.
CMDFIRST GROUPKEY
This is the reply that the BS sends in response to authentication requests. If this
message is intended for a CH, then it also contains the a new cluster key.
CMD REFRESH GROUP KEY;
This message is periodically broadcast by the BS, and always contains a new
system key, encrypted with the previous system key. This message is the primary method
of continuous authentication within the SPECTRA network
CMDNEWCLUSTERKEY
Sent whenever a cluster needs to distribute a new cluster key to it's nodes. This is
not used during the cluster organization phase. This message is only used to refresh the
cluster key after a node in the cluster has been compromised. The original cluster key
during initial system setup is contained in the cluster advertisement.
CLUSTERADVERTISEMENT
Sent by all CHs after they are authenticated. Contains the CH ID and the cluster
key. Nodes record the RSS with which they receive this message, and join the CH from
which they received the highest RSS. This message is broadcast, and all nodes record the
existence of the sending CH, for use in constructing routing tables.
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CLUSTERNODE JOINS
Sent by all nodes after they are authenticated. Informs the CH that the node is
joining the cluster. This message is broadcast, and all nodes record the existence of the
sending node, for use in constructing routing tables.
SECNODE
This is the initial request for authentication from a node to the BS. It is broadcast,
and the BS replies with a CMD FIRST GROUP KEY message.
SECCH
This is the initial request for authentication from a CH to the BS. It is broadcast,
and the BS replies with a CMDFIRSTGROUPKEY message.
NODEREMOVAL
This message is broadcast when a node or CH discovers that one of it's neighbors
is missing, due to node-death, wireless errors, or compromise. This message informs all
recipients to remove the missing node from their routing tables, and if a CH receives this
message, it will refresh its cluster key because the old cluster keymay be compromised.
CLUSTER_REORG
This command is sent by the BS when it discovers that one of it's CHs is gone.
The BS finds this out from a NODEREMOVAL message. The nodes who used to
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belong to the now missing CH must join nearby clusters, the same way as it would be
done in node-addition, except that the cluster-less nodes already have the latest system
key.
REFRESHCLUSTERKEY
Called by a CH when it discovers that one of its nodes is missing and has perhaps
been compromised. This message contains a new cluster-key, encrypted with the current
system key.
A.9 Application LayerMessages
The Application layer has the most complicated messages. Application layer
messages always begin with a type which dictates the contents of the rest of the message.
Depending on the message type, the second field is often a request ID, a 1 6-bit counter
identifying the BS request that this packet is associated with and results from.
The message types, extracted from WSNApp.java, are:
static final short NODE_DATA = 100;
Data sent from a node to its CH on a periodic basis, not associated with a specific
BS request.
static final short CH_DATA = 101;
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Aggregated data sent from a CH to the BS, not associated with a particular
request
static final short NODE_RESPONSE = 102;
Data sent from a node to its CH in response to a specific request
static final short CH_RESPONSE = 103;
Aggregated data sent from the CH to the BS in response to a specific request
static final short CH_REQUEST = 104;
Request for data from the BS to a CH
static final short NODE_REQUEST = 105;
Request for data from a CH to one or all of its nodes.
static final short BEGIN_MONITOR = 106;
Instruction for a node or CH to start making periodic reports ofdata
static final short END_MONITOR = 107;
Instruction for a node or CH to stop making periodic reports ofdata
static final short NODE_DEATH = 108;
Notification that a node is low on power
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